| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| jackson-databind validates the outer class of a class-name type ID but accepts attacker-selected classes inside its generic arguments, even when those classes violate the declared type or would be rejected as direct type IDs. This bypasses the generic-argument validation added for CVE-2026-54512 (GHSA-j3rv-43j4-c7qm), of which this is an incomplete fix.
DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() checks the outer class against the declared base type and then passes each argument from the type ID to _validateTypeParameter(), which validates the argument against the outer base type rather than enforcing its corresponding declared generic binding. It also invokes validators with arguments that have not passed the subtype check those validators expect. Under the default DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator this accepts an unrelated class inside a generic subtype even when the same class is rejected as a direct type ID. Where an allowIfBaseType(...) rule approves the outer type, Jackson substitutes LaissezFaireSubTypeValidator, so the configured validator no longer restricts the embedded arguments. The element type of a plain array type ID such as [Lpkg.Gadget; is likewise left unvalidated once the array's base type is approved.
Affected paths include annotation-based class-name polymorphism with a default Jackson 3.x JsonMapper, configured default typing in both Jackson 2.x and 3.x, and integrations that expose that default typing. The default-validator case requires no application-authored validator: with @JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.CLASS), a direct gadget type ID is rejected as "Not a subtype", while a type ID naming a generic wrapper around the same gadget is accepted and deserialized, including attacker-supplied bean properties. Where class-name default typing permits Map, a property declared as Map<String,String> accepts HashMap<FileSystemXmlApplicationContext,String>; map-key discovery then passes the attacker-controlled JSON property name to the selected class's one-string constructor. With Spring on the classpath and attacker-controlled XML the application can load, that constructor loads the XML and invokes ProcessBuilder.start() under the application account, giving arbitrary command execution.
This issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 2.10.0 and tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 3.0.0. Releases before 2.10.0 are not affected, because PolymorphicTypeValidator was introduced in jackson-databind 2.10.0. |
| FasterXML Jackson 1.x, confirmed in jackson-mapper-asl versions 1.8.3, 1.9.2, 1.9.11, 1.9.12, and 1.9.13, allows attackers to cause a denial of service by supplying deeply nested JSON input to an application that deserializes untrusted JSON using ObjectMapper.readValue. |
| StreamReadConstraints.maxNameLength (default 50,000 characters) is intended to bound how much memory a single JSON Object property name can consume while being parsed, independently of the much larger maxStringLength (default 100,000,000 characters) that bounds ordinary string values. For parsers built over character input — Reader, String or char[] sources, all served by ReaderBasedJsonParser — that bound is not applied while the name is being accumulated. The code path instead re-uses the string-value length check, which is roughly 2000x larger by default.
In the character-input slow path, ReaderBasedJsonParser._parseName2() accumulates the name into the TextBuffer and, when a segment fills, calls TextBuffer.finishCurrentSegment(), which validates only maxStringLength. The correct check, StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength(int), is reached afterwards in CharsToNameCanonicalizer.findSymbol(), once the entire name has been scanned to its closing quote. By that point the full name — up to maxStringLength characters — has already been buffered in memory.
A remote attacker who can have a single sufficiently long JSON Object property name parsed through this path can force allocation on the order of 100,000,000 characters (approximately 200 MB, with segment bookkeeping pushing real peak usage higher) before any StreamConstraintsException is thrown, instead of the approximately 50,000-character (about 100 KB) bound the API promises. Repeating this across concurrent requests can exhaust the heap and crash the process. No authentication or user interaction is required. Because StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength is disabled by default (-1), nothing else bounds the token first, so the issue is exploitable under default configuration.
Byte-input parsers are not affected: UTF8StreamJsonParser, UTF8DataInputJsonParser and the non-blocking (async) parsers re-validate maxNameLength on every growth of the name-decode buffer via ParserBase._growNameDecodeBuffer(), rejecting an oversized name after allocating only tens of kilobytes. Applications are exposed when untrusted JSON is parsed from a String, Reader or char[] — for example an HTTP request body already read into a String — rather than from raw UTF-8 bytes.
This issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core from 2.16.0 and tools.jackson.core:jackson-core from 3.0.0. Releases before 2.16.0 are not affected, because StreamReadConstraints.maxNameLength was first introduced in jackson-core 2.16.0. |
| FasterXML jackson-databind before 2.7.9.3, 2.8.x before 2.8.11.1 and 2.9.x before 2.9.5 allows unauthenticated remote code execution because of an incomplete fix for the CVE-2017-7525 deserialization flaw. This is exploitable by sending maliciously crafted JSON input to the readValue method of the ObjectMapper, bypassing a blacklist that is ineffective if the c3p0 libraries are available in the classpath. |
| FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.8 might allow attackers to have unspecified impact by leveraging failure to block the jboss-common-core class from polymorphic deserialization. |
| FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.8 might allow attackers to have unspecified impact by leveraging failure to block the openjpa class from polymorphic deserialization. |
| FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.8 might allow attackers to have unspecified impact by leveraging failure to block the axis2-transport-jms class from polymorphic deserialization. |
| FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.7 might allow remote attackers to conduct server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks by leveraging failure to block the axis2-jaxws class from polymorphic deserialization. |
| FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.7 might allow attackers to conduct external XML entity (XXE) attacks by leveraging failure to block unspecified JDK classes from polymorphic deserialization. |
| An issue was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind prior to 2.7.9.4, 2.8.11.2, and 2.9.6. When Default Typing is enabled (either globally or for a specific property), the service has the Oracle JDBC jar in the classpath, and an attacker can provide an LDAP service to access, it is possible to make the service execute a malicious payload. |
| FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.10.5 mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing, related to org.jsecurity.realm.jndi.JndiRealmFactory (aka org.jsecurity). |
| A flaw was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind in all versions before 2.9.10 and 2.10.0, where it would permit polymorphic deserialization of malicious objects using the xalan JNDI gadget when used in conjunction with polymorphic type handling methods such as `enableDefaultTyping()` or when @JsonTypeInfo is using `Id.CLASS` or `Id.MINIMAL_CLASS` or in any other way which ObjectMapper.readValue might instantiate objects from unsafe sources. An attacker could use this flaw to execute arbitrary code. |
| FasterXML jackson-databind through 2.8.11 and 2.9.x through 2.9.3 allows unauthenticated remote code execution because of an incomplete fix for the CVE-2017-7525 and CVE-2017-17485 deserialization flaws. This is exploitable via two different gadgets that bypass a blacklist. |
| A deserialization flaw was discovered in the jackson-databind, versions before 2.6.7.1, 2.7.9.1 and 2.8.9, which could allow an unauthenticated user to perform code execution by sending the maliciously crafted input to the readValue method of the ObjectMapper. |
| A deserialization flaw was discovered in the jackson-databind in versions before 2.8.10 and 2.9.1, which could allow an unauthenticated user to perform code execution by sending the maliciously crafted input to the readValue method of the ObjectMapper. This issue extends the previous flaw CVE-2017-7525 by blacklisting more classes that could be used maliciously. |
| FasterXML jackson-databind 2.0.0 through 2.9.10.2 lacks certain xbean-reflect/JNDI blocking, as demonstrated by org.apache.xbean.propertyeditor.JndiConverter. |
| FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.10.8 mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing, related to com.newrelic.agent.deps.ch.qos.logback.core.db.DriverManagerConnectionSource. |
| FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.10.8 mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing, related to com.newrelic.agent.deps.ch.qos.logback.core.db.JNDIConnectionSource. |
| FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.10.8 mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing, related to org.apache.tomcat.dbcp.dbcp.datasources.SharedPoolDataSource. |
| FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.10.8 mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing, related to org.apache.tomcat.dbcp.dbcp.datasources.PerUserPoolDataSource. |
