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Search Results (430125 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-99574 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 5.1 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: bound the SIT/NAT bitmaps by the checkpoint pack sit_ver_bitmap_bytesize and nat_ver_bitmap_bytesize are used as memcpy lengths into and out of sbi->ckpt, which is sized from cp_payload alone, and nothing compares either length against that allocation. sanity_check_ckpt() has checked these two fields since c77ec61ca0a4, which added them after a crafted image overran build_sit_info(). That check ties each length to a segment count; it never compares either against the allocation, which is the half this adds. Mounting over-reads in build_sit_info() and build_node_manager(), and the first checkpoint writes the same lengths back through the same pointers, so the over-read's contents reach the on-disk checkpoint. An unmount is enough; the filesystem does not have to be used. Bound both ends the way __bitmap_ptr() lays them out. The three branches differ, so a single sum of the two lengths would still admit a small overflow when cp_payload is non-zero. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99575 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: return -EIO for a lost inode block after cp_error After cp_error, dirty node caches are dropped without being written. If such an inode was never written, its NAT entry is still NEW_ADDR, and reading its inode block returns -ENOENT. f2fs_get_dnode_of_data() passes that -ENOENT up, and callers take it as a hole. Since the inode block is missing, the next offset can only advance one block, so fiemap walks block by block up to maxbytes, about 2^30 blocks, while holding the inode lock. It took hours in a power-off recovery test after shutdown and blocked unlink and umount on the file. Return -EIO instead of -ENOENT when the inode block itself is missing after cp_error or shutdown. A missing direct or indirect node is still reported as -ENOENT. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99576 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: zone: fix to avoid bio split on sequential zone In the block layer, bio_split_to_limits() splits a bio if it exceeds any underlying queue limits: 1. queue_max_sectors: Splits bios larger than the transfer limit. This limit is set by the device driver/DMA controller (max_hw_sectors) and device-mapper targets. When flushing dirty pages (governed by VFS writeback_chunk_size() and f2fs nr_pages_to_skip()), f2fs merges contiguous pages into bios up to 512KB (1024 sectors) or more without checking queue_max_sectors, which will be split if the device or DM target enforces a smaller limit. 2. queue_max_segments: Splits bios exceeding scatter-gather segment limits. f2fs allocates bios with up to 256 pages, exceeding the 128-segment limit of DM targets (dm-default-key/dm-crypt) if pages are discontiguous. 3. chunk_sectors: Splits bios crossing chunk/zone boundaries. In f2fs, section_size strictly matches zone_size, and block allocation never spans across section boundaries, so bios never cross chunk_sectors. Crucially, when bio_split_to_limits() splits a bio, bio_submit_split() submits the tail half via submit_bio_noacct() before returning the head half to the caller. On a sequential zoned device, this causes the tail bio to arrive at the zone write plug before the head: dm-3: zone 7: prepare_bio wp mismatch: bio sector 30720 offset 2048 != wp_offset 248, len 248 The write plug rejects the out-of-order tail with BLK_STS_IOERR, causing f2fs_stop_checkpoint() and remounting the filesystem read-only: 2026-09-30T22:09:23.725678+08:00 localhost kernel: CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 243 Comm: kworker/9:1H Not tainted 6.12.81-gb3ef518fb26d #5 2026-09-30T22:09:23.725750+08:00 localhost kernel: Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014 2026-09-30T22:09:23.725753+08:00 localhost kernel: Workqueue: dm-3_zwplugs blk_zone_wplug_bio_work 2026-09-30T22:09:23.725756+08:00 localhost kernel: Call Trace: 2026-09-30T22:09:23.725758+08:00 localhost kernel: <TASK> 2026-09-30T22:09:23.725758+08:00 localhost kernel: dump_stack_lvl+0x4d/0x70 2026-09-30T22:09:23.725759+08:00 localhost kernel: f2fs_stop_checkpoint+0x1df/0x5d0 2026-09-30T22:09:23.725759+08:00 localhost kernel: ? blk_zone_wplug_bio_work+0x4eb/0x740 2026-09-30T22:09:23.725760+08:00 localhost kernel: f2fs_cache_write_end_io+0x545/0x6e0 2026-09-30T22:09:23.725761+08:00 localhost kernel: blk_zone_wplug_bio_work+0x4eb/0x740 2026-09-30T22:09:23.725762+08:00 localhost kernel: process_one_work+0x5c6/0xde0 2026-09-30T22:09:23.725764+08:00 localhost kernel: ? assign_work+0x124/0x4e0 2026-09-30T22:09:23.725765+08:00 localhost kernel: worker_thread+0x403/0xb70 2026-09-30T22:09:23.725765+08:00 localhost kernel: ? __kthread_parkme+0x82/0x140 2026-09-30T22:09:23.725766+08:00 localhost kernel: ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 2026-09-30T22:09:23.725766+08:00 localhost kernel: kthread+0x235/0x2e0 2026-09-30T22:09:23.725767+08:00 localhost kernel: ? recalc_sigpending+0x128/0x1d0 2026-09-30T22:09:23.725767+08:00 localhost kernel: ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 2026-09-30T22:09:23.725769+08:00 localhost kernel: ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x70 2026-09-30T22:09:23.725769+08:00 localhost kernel: ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 2026-09-30T22:09:23.725770+08:00 localhost kernel: ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 2026-09-30T22:09:23.725771+08:00 localhost kernel: </TASK> 2026-09-30T22:09:23.725771+08:00 localhost kernel: F2FS-fs (dm-0): Stopped filesystem due to reason: 3 To prevent write bios destined for sequential zones from being split: 1. In __bio_alloc(), bound npages to bdev_max_segments(bdev) for writes to sequential zone areas. 2. In page_is_mergeable(), check queue_max_segments() and queue_max_sectors() for sequential zone areas, so f2fs will not merge beyond the queue limits. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99577 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 6.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: rtw88: usb: bound what the driver feeds the after-DTIM queue Frames routed to the high queue are transmitted right after DTIM beacons only, inside the ATIM window, while they wait in the shared TX page pool. The driver puts no limit on how many it hands over, so as long as one station dozes, any sustained broadcast or multicast traffic outruns the drain and empties the pool: measured on an RTL8822BU AP with a single client in power save and ~40 frames/s of mDNS chatter, the free page count at 0x240 goes from 1803 to 16 in about 100 seconds and stays there for as long as the traffic lasts. From that point every other transmit queues behind the backlog, authentication responses arrive too late for anyone to join, and the reserved page download fails ("error beacon valid"). The AP keeps beaconing and only a reboot recovers. Feed the high queue through a small budget that refills below the measured drain rate (about 3 frames per DTIM, ~15/s at dtim_period 2 on the default 2 TU ATIM window); whatever exceeds the budget leaves on its access category queue right away. The high queue backlog is now bounded by the burst size under any load, so the page pool cannot run dry, at the price that a dozing station may miss part of a broadcast storm. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99578 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 6.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: rtw88: usb: route bmc frames via the high queue only for DTIM delivery In AP mode every broadcast and multicast data frame is routed to TX_DESC_QSEL_HIGH, the after-DTIM queue, whether or not anybody is asleep. The firmware drains that queue at beacon pace, a dozen or so frames per second measured on RTL8822BU, while one associated client's mDNS/SSDP chatter alone exceeds that. The excess accumulates inside the chip until the shared TX page pool is exhausted (measured: 14 of 1803 pages left). From that point every host-sourced frame queues behind the backlog: authentication responses reach the air seconds after the client has given up, so no station can associate anymore, and the beacon reserved-page download fails the BCN_VALID poll ("error beacon valid") because it needs pages from the same pool. The AP keeps beaconing, so the failure looks like a silent RX stall and only a reboot recovers. mac80211 already decides when after-DTIM delivery is needed: it sets IEEE80211_TX_CTL_SEND_AFTER_DTIM on bmc frames only while at least one station is actually dozing. Honor that instead of routing unconditionally: flagged frames keep going through the high queue with the MORE_DATA and HGQMD handling introduced by commit 076f786a0ae1 ("wifi: rtw88: Fix AP mode incorrect DTIM behavior"), everything else leaves at line rate through the AC queues. This partially reverts the usb.c hunk of that commit, whose unconditional routing is what lets the backlog build up. On a bench AP (USB2, 20 MHz, WPA2, hostapd, a Windows client driven through disconnect/reconnect cycles): reconnects fail 0/5 on RTL8822BU and 0/3 on RTL8821CU before this change, and pass 10/10 and 5/5 with it, with the page pool staying healthy and no beacon errors logged. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99579 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 3.3 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/shmem: honour F_SEAL_EXEC when an ACL is set The owner of a memfd sealed with F_SEAL_EXEC can still change its execute bits by setting a POSIX access ACL. With CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL, this lets an unprivileged owner make a non-executable memfd executable, bypassing vm.memfd_noexec=2. simple_set_acl() updates i_mode directly, bypassing the seal check in shmem_setattr(). Add shmem_set_acl() to check the resulting mode. Share the F_SEAL_EXEC check with shmem_setattr() using memfd_check_seals_mode() in include/linux/memfd.h. Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Chris Mason in private. [ david: use common helper; simplify description ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-99580 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/userfaultfd: only allocate anon_vma in CoW mappings find_vma_and_prepare_anon() can end up allocating an anon_vma in VMAs that are not CoW mappings, which is wrong. If we have a MAP_SHARED R/O file mapped, we lack VM_SHARED (but do have VM_MAYSHARE) and lack VM_MAYWRITE. While uffd later rejects such mappings (uffd registration requires VM_MAYWRITE, see comment in validate_dst_vma) find_vma_and_prepare_anon() still wrongly allocates an anon vma before it validates the vma. This in turn later confuses copy_page_range()->vma_needs_copy() such that we end up calling copy_hugetlb_page_range() with ranges that actually do not contain *any* per-pagetable information that would require copying, which is the basis for PMD-table sharing in the first place. copy_hugetlb_page_range() should not have to worry about shared PMD tables at all: it doesn't make any sense to copy page tables that are shared, as they can be fully recreated later. Ending up in the function with shareable page tables is the real issue. If a destination PMD table is shared in copy_hugetlb_page_range(), it might get concurrently unshared as we are not holding relevant locks, resulting in us using a page table that is no longer mapped and possibly freed after calling: dst_pte = huge_pte_alloc(dst, dst_vma, addr, sz); To fix it, do not allocate an anon_vma in non-CoW mappings and add a safety guard to copy_hugetlb_page_range(), making sure that we never end up messing with shared PMD tables in there. Before commit 867a43a34ff8a ("userfaultfd: use per-vma locks in userfaultfd operations") we would always validate the VMA before allocating an anon_vma, and consequently never wrongly allocate an anon_vma. As uffd_lock_vma() is part of the same lookup machinery and also contains a misleading VM_SHARED check, change that one as well directly for consistency. A follow-up cleanup will stop taking the hugetlb_vma_lock_read(src_vma) lock in copy_hugetlb_page_range() entirely. Further, the usage of VM_SHARED in userfaultfd code should be cleaned up later to focus on CoW vs. non-CoW mappings. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99581 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 4.6 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/chrome: cros_usbpd_notify: Only use drvdata when parent is GOOG0004 cros_usbpd_notify_probe_acpi() takes the EC device pointer from dev_get_drvdata(dev->parent) and assumes it is a struct cros_ec_device. That only holds when GOOG0003 is a child of GOOG0004. On older devices without that hierarchy, such as Google Nami, GOOG0003 and GOOG0004 are siblings under the ACPI EC (PNP0C09): PNP0C09:00 (acpi-ec) |-- GOOG0003:00 (cros-usbpd-notify-acpi) `-- GOOG0004:00 (cros_ec_lpcs) Before commit db65a06d10b3 ("ACPI: EC: Convert the driver to a platform one") the parent platform device had no driver data, so the driver warned and continued without an EC pointer, as intended for these devices. Since that commit the ACPI EC driver stores its struct acpi_ec there, so the driver treats a struct acpi_ec as a struct cros_ec_device and calls cros_ec_cmd() on it for every USB-C PD host event. Plugging or unplugging a charger then intermittently oopses, followed by soft lockups and a hung system: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffff9cf03220 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode Hardware name: Google Nami/Nami, BIOS 09/19/2019 Workqueue: kacpi_notify acpi_os_execute_deferred RIP: 0010:native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x29d/0x330 Call Trace: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x59/0x80 __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x129/0x930 cros_ec_cmd_xfer+0x2a/0xf0 [cros_ec_proto] cros_ec_cmd_xfer_status+0x1a/0x90 [cros_ec_proto] cros_ec_cmd+0xb7/0x140 [cros_ec_proto] cros_usbpd_get_event_and_notify+0x42/0xc0 [cros_usbpd_notify] acpi_ev_notify_dispatch+0x4e/0x70 acpi_os_execute_deferred+0x1a/0x30 Only read the parent's driver data when the parent's ACPI node is GOOG0004, and otherwise continue without an EC pointer. While at it, drop the reference taken by fwnode_get_parent(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-99616 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovl: look up the index by the decoded origin A file opened by file handle on an overlay with nfs_export=on can show the stale lower data of a file that was copied up to the upper layer. While the file opened this way stays in the inode cache, a lookup of the copied up file by path fails with ESTALE for all users. The open can also succeed for a file that was removed, where it has to fail with ESTALE. This happens with a handle that has one byte changed. The handle comes from an NFS client, or from a process that calls open_by_handle_at() with CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH in the initial user namespace. When a file in a lower layer is about to be modified, overlayfs first copies it to the upper layer (copy up). With nfs_export=on, each copy up also creates an entry in the index directory, a directory that overlayfs keeps for itself on the upper filesystem. The handle of an overlay file that comes from a lower layer wraps the handle of its lower inode. Overlayfs calls this lower inode the origin. The overlay handle stays valid after a copy up. To decode such a handle, ovl_lower_fh_to_d() first decodes the wrapped handle to the origin. If no overlay inode is cached for the origin, it looks in the index directory: - An index entry there leads to the upper file. - A whiteout, the marker that overlayfs uses for a removed file, means that the overlay file was removed. The name of an index entry is the handle that copy up encoded for the origin, as a hex string. ovl_lower_fh_to_d() builds the name for this lookup from the bytes that the caller passed in. But handles with different bytes can decode to the same inode: - Overlayfs ignores some flag bits of the handle. - A lower filesystem can accept a different fid type, extra bytes, or generation 0 for any generation. Such a handle decodes to the origin but misses the index entry or the whiteout. So the decode returns an overlay inode that has only the lower file. While that inode is cached, a path lookup of a copied up file fails with ESTALE, since the upper file that the lookup finds does not match the cached inode, which has none. Reproduced on tmpfs and on ext4 with open_by_handle_at(), after a copy up and a mount cycle. A handle in which one flag bit, the fid type, the length or the generation was changed read the old lower data, and path lookups returned ESTALE. Fix this by re-encoding the decoded origin and building the index name from that handle. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99618 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet: don't return memory contents beyond valid data when reading ANA log page The host side does not know how much valid data will be returned by the target so it will typically provide a buffer larger than the amount of valid data in the ANA log page. The memory allocation used by the target does not guarantee that prior kernel memory contents will not be returned past the end of the valid page data. Fix this to ensure that the SGL is zeroed before copying the data. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99634 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: do not use Fast Open on MP_JOIN subflows tcp_fastopen_create_child() hands the SYN packet itself to subflow_syn_recv_sock(). For an MP_JOIN request this takes the fatal fallback: the cloned child is destroyed and handed back with drop_req flagged, but tcp_fastopen_create_child() does not check the flag and queues it, so accept() can expose the freed child. MP_JOIN cannot use Fast Open: data on a subflow requires the completed HMAC exchange (RFC 8684, sec. 3.2). Refuse it (only the TFO path passes a SYN skb here) and let tcp_conn_request() fall back to the regular MP_JOIN handshake; also strip the Fast Open cookie from MP_JOIN SYN/ACKs. [ Moving code to avoid clearing TS and consolidating checks. ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-99639 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 3.3 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovl: fix whiteout creation in casefolded directories unlink and rmdir fail with EINVAL on an overlay with casefolded (case-insensitive) layers, if the name exists in a lower layer. Casefolded layers need CONFIG_UNICODE. Root can mount such an overlay, and so can an unprivileged user in a user namespace, with tmpfs layers. Overlayfs does not change a lower layer. To remove a name that exists there, it hides the name with a marker file, a whiteout. It creates the whiteout in the work directory, a scratch directory on the upper filesystem, and renames it over the name in the upper directory: - ovl_whiteout() creates the whiteout with mknod, or as a hard link to an earlier whiteout. - ovl_cleanup_and_whiteout() then prepares the rename with start_renaming_two_dentries(), which returns -EINVAL if the source or the target dentry is unhashed, that is, not in the dentry hash table. With casefolded directories, both dentries can be unhashed: - The target. Lookup in a casefolded directory leaves a negative dentry unhashed, so the rename target is unhashed if the name does not exist in the upper directory. - The source, which is the new whiteout. tmpfs hashes a dentry when mknod or link makes it positive, but ext4 does not, so on ext4 the source is unhashed as well. The cleanup after the failure also refuses an unhashed dentry, so on ext4 the whiteout is left behind in the work directory. Reproduced with rm and rmdir on casefolded tmpfs and ext4 layers, also as uid 1000 in a user namespace. Fix this by creating the whiteout with ovl_create_temp(), which repeats the lookup if the new dentry is unhashed. Prepare the rename with start_renaming_dentry(), which looks up the target name with the directories locked. The caller looked the name up without a lock, so return -ESTALE if the name now refers to a different inode. [amir: pass the name used for lookup instead of taking a name snapshot] | ||||
| CVE-2026-99643 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: khugepaged: fix readahead lock inversion in collapse_file() collapse_file() can call page_cache_sync_readahead() while still holding source folios locked. If truncate holds mapping->invalidate_lock exclusively and waits for one of those folios, readahead waits for invalidate_lock and neither side can make progress. We need to release those folio locks before starting readahead. On a page cache miss, roll back first, populate the collapse range, and retry once. Doing readahead after rollback avoids an extra pass when all folios are already present. If another miss occurs on retry, give up rather than keep retrying while truncate or reclaim removes folios. Keep page_cache_sync_readahead() and wait for read I/O with filemap_lock_folio(), releasing each folio before moving to the next. The existing uptodate check during collapse still handles read errors. Shmem uses shmem_get_folio() for swapin and fallocated folios without taking mapping->invalidate_lock, so it is unaffected. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99646 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/vma: don't leak the charge for stack growth acct_stack_growth() charges stack expansion even without VM_ACCOUNT. This can happen for read-only or MAP_NORESERVE mappings created with MAP_GROWSDOWN. Unmapping these VMAs does not release the charge, leaking Committed_AS. Only check and charge growth for VM_ACCOUNT VMAs, matching mremap(). Unaccounted growth skips the overcommit check while remaining subject to the other stack-growth limits. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99647 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/huge_memory: split huge PUDs when adjusting VMA boundaries PFN mappings such as VFIO PCI BAR mappings can use PUD leaves while allowing VMA splits at page granularity. However, vma_adjust_trans_huge() only handles PMDs. After faulting a writable PUD-sized VFIO BAR mapping, changing its first page to read-only with mprotect() makes the PMD walk treat the PUD leaf as a PMD table. Applying MADV_DONTFORK to the first PMD-sized chunk leaves the PUD spanning two VMAs: the PMD-aligned boundary skips splitting. Walk the page tables once at each adjusted boundary and split a huge PUD or PMD leaf as needed. Handle PUD leaves even when the boundary is PMD-aligned. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99648 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/vma: call ->may_split() before a partial merge A driver can use the ->may_split() hook to forbid a VMA boundary at certain addresses. A device-dax device is a character device that gives raw access to a range of memory through mmap(). device-dax refuses any address that is not a multiple of the device's alignment through vm_ops->may_split. vma_merge_existing_range() can move boundaries, but does not call vm_ops->may_split. If a range at the edge of a VMA gets the attributes of the adjacent VMA, the function moves only that range over to the neighbour: one VMA shrinks and the other grows. This is a partial merge, and vma_modify() tries it before any split. Take a device-dax VMA that lies next to another VMA of the same file. The user calls mprotect() on the one page of the first VMA that touches the second VMA, and asks for the protection that the second VMA already has. The result is a partial merge. It puts the boundary inside a 1 GiB mapping, which is a single leaf entry at the PUD level. As part of the merge, the kernel looks for a huge PMD to split at the new boundary. That code does not expect a PUD leaf: vma_merge_existing_range() commit_merge() vma_adjust_trans_huge() split_huge_pmd_address() mm_find_pmd() treats the PUD leaf as a pointer to a PMD table, so the "table" is the device memory that the leaf maps __split_huge_pmd() reads a PMD that the user wrote to the device memory folio_put() on the folio that this PMD names Bad. While the code must at some point be taught to split PUD entries as well, the issue here is that we move VMA boundaries such that they are incompatible with the driver. Fix this by calling ->may_split() on the address that a partial merge would move the boundary to, and by abandoning the merge if the driver refuses. vma_modify() then tries the split, which fails with -EINVAL. Factor out existing split handling into check_split() and reuse it. Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Chris Mason in private. [ david: improve description; cleanup the code ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-99649 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 2.5 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/ksm: check large swap-cache folios before mapping them KSM folios are always small, but their shared swap slots can be read back as part of a large folio in the swap cache. ksm_might_need_to_copy() skips large folios, so another process can map a page with an incompatible anon_vma or page index. Reverse mapping then cannot find the new mapping, preventing migration or reclaim. Apply the same compatibility checks to large folios as to small ones. Pass the page corresponding to the swap entry and copy only that page when necessary. In do_swap_page()'s copy path, decrement only that slot's swap count, because the source swap-cache folio can now be large. Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Chris Mason in private. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99650 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/ksm: fix use of a freed anon_vma at swap-in A folio read from a swap slot previously shared by KSM can remain in the swap cache after the process that first mapped it exits. Its anon_vma can then be freed, so ksm_might_need_to_copy() must not dereference it to compare roots. Doing so can result in some false-positives, resulting in the reverse mapping missing the new folio mapping, preventing migration and reclaim. SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU allows individual anon_vma objects to be reused immediately after freeing. A stale pointer can then refer to another anon_vma whose root matches, even though the target VMA is not linked to that anon_vma. Move the anonymous rmap compatibility checks into folio_anon_rmap_compatible(). Keep the page-index check and compare the folio's anon_vma pointer against the VMA's own anon_vma and root first. If neither matches, bite the bullet and walk the VMA's anon_vma_chain. The VMA keeps these anon_vmas alive, and finding a match guarantees that reverse mapping can find the new mapping. Lorenzo Stoakes says in a private discussion: "This isn't quite equivalent to the existing check. Every anon_vma in an anon_vma_chain shares the same root, but if you split a VMA then fork both of them like this: VMA A / \ <split> VMA B VMA C \ / root <- anon_vma 1 ----^ ^---- <fork> / parent \ anon_vma 2 anon_vma 3 | | VMA D VMA E VMA's D and E both get their own new anon_vma's such that: VMA D: anon_vma 2 -> anon_vma 1 -> root VMA E: anon_vma 3 -> anon_vma 1 -> root And if you found a folio referencing anon_vma 2, the existing check: anon_vma->root == vma->anon-vma->root Would be true for VMA's B, C, D & E. However after your change it'd be true for VMA D only, as it's the only one with anon_vma 2 in its anon_vma_chain. Whether or not that could actually happen in practice... 🙂 I don't know. [...] after your change it'd be true for VMA D only, as it's the only one with anon_vma 2 in its anon_vma_chain. [...] I would [...] say that you are making the test stricter but more correct. " If this affects performance when KSM was never even involved, we could just track whether KSM ever merged anything and just skip these checks. There isn't really a lot we can do otherwise: for mapped folios we might be able to use folio_get_anon_vma(), but for unmapped folios there really is no easy way to see if the anon_vma is still valid. Document the (confusing) lifetime requirements of folio_anon_vma(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-99652 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: fix deadlock of mremap() against UFFDIO_MOVE With per-VMA locks, UFFDIO_MOVE can run concurrently with mremap() on different VMAs in the same mm. Those VMAs can share page tables, so both operations can acquire the same pair of page-table locks. UFFDIO_MOVE orders the locks by address, while mremap() takes the source lock first. These conflicting orders can deadlock; mremap() holding mmap_lock for writing no longer helps. Move double_pt_lock() and double_pt_unlock() to mm/internal.h and use them for all page-table moves in mremap(). Preserve the source entry checks after acquiring both locks. Remove the comments claiming that exclusive mmap_lock makes lock ordering irrelevant. In move_ptes(), make sure to just recheck source and destination PMD after taking the locks and drop the overly-long comment. Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Chris Mason in private. [ david: use new helpers consistently; simplify description and comments; move_ptes() fixup ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-99653 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: fix unkillable fault loop on MAP_DROPPABLE memory handle_mm_fault() suppresses VM_FAULT_OOM for VM_DROPPABLE mappings. For user-mode faults, pending signals are processed before retrying the access. Kernel-mode faults on user buffers instead return directly to the faulting instruction. With persistent allocation failures (esp. memcg limits), a syscall, such as write(), can therefore loop while not dropping locks. Only suppress VM_FAULT_OOM when FAULT_FLAG_USER is set, allowing kernel-mode faults and GUP to fail and signal allocation errors. Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Chris Mason in private. [ david: simplify description ] | ||||