| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: remove redundant netdev_lock_ops() from conduit ethtool ops
DSA replaces the conduit (master) device's ethtool_ops with its own
wrappers that aggregate stats from both the conduit and DSA switch
ports. Taking the lock again inside the DSA wrappers causes a deadlock.
Stumbled upon this when booting qemu with fbnic and CONFIG_NET_DSA_LOOP=y
(which looks like some kind of testing device that auto-populates the ports
of eth0). `ethtool -i` is enough to deadlock. This means we have basically zero
coverage for DSA stuff with real ops locked devs.
Remove the redundant netdev_lock_ops()/netdev_unlock_ops() calls from
the DSA conduit ethtool wrappers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm: Fix VM_BIND UNMAP locking
Wrong argument meant that the objs involved in UNMAP ops were not always
getting locked.
Since _NO_SHARE objs share a common resv with the VM (which is always
locked) this would only show up with non-_NO_SHARE BOs.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/713898/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: psp: check for device unregister when creating assoc
psp_assoc_device_get_locked() obtains a psp_dev reference via
psp_dev_get_for_sock() (which uses psp_dev_tryget() under RCU);
it then acquires psd->lock and drops the reference. Before
the lock is taken, psp_dev_unregister() can run to completion:
take psd->lock, clear out state, unlock, drop the registration
reference.
The expectation is that the lock prevents device unregistration,
but much like with netdevs special care has to be taken when
"upgrading" a reference to a locked device. Add the missing
check if device is still alive. psp_dev_is_registered() exists
already but had no callers, which makes me wonder if I either
forgot to add this or lost the check during refactoring... |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: iptfs: fix ABBA deadlock in iptfs_destroy_state()
iptfs_destroy_state() calls hrtimer_cancel() while holding a spinlock
that the timer callback also acquires, leading to an ABBA deadlock on
SMP systems.
For the output timer (iptfs_timer):
- iptfs_destroy_state() holds x->lock, calls hrtimer_cancel()
- iptfs_delay_timer() callback takes x->lock
For the drop timer (drop_timer):
- iptfs_destroy_state() holds drop_lock, calls hrtimer_cancel()
- iptfs_drop_timer() callback takes drop_lock
Both timers use HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT, so their callbacks run in softirq
context. When hrtimer_cancel() is called for a soft timer that is
currently executing on another CPU, hrtimer_cancel_wait_running() spins
on softirq_expiry_lock -- the same lock held by the softirq running the
callback. If the callback is blocked waiting for the spinlock held by
the caller of hrtimer_cancel(), a circular dependency forms:
CPU 0: holds lock_A -> waits for softirq_expiry_lock
CPU 1: holds softirq_expiry_lock -> waits for lock_A
Fix by calling hrtimer_cancel() before acquiring the respective locks.
hrtimer_cancel() is safe to call without holding any lock and will wait
for any in-progress callback to complete. For the output timer, the
lock is still acquired afterwards to drain the packet queue. For the
drop timer, the lock/unlock pair is removed entirely since it only
existed to serialize with the timer callback, which hrtimer_cancel()
already guarantees.
Found by source code audit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: phy: don't try to setup PHY-driven SFP cages when using genphy
We don't have support for PHY-driver SFP cages with the genphy code.
On top of that, it was found by sashiko that running
sfp_bus_add_upstream() for genphy deadlocks, as for genphy the PHY
probing runs under RTNL, which isn't the case for non-genphy drivers.
This problem was reproduced, and does lead to a deadlock on RTNL.
Before the blamed commit, the phy_sfp_probe() call was made by
individual PHY drivers, so there was no way to get to the SFP probing
path when using genphy.
Let's therefore only run phy_sfp_probe when not using genphy. |
| concurrent-ruby is a modern concurrency tools for Ruby. Prior to 1.3.7, Concurrent::ReadWriteLock#release_write_lock does not verify that the calling thread acquired the write lock. Any thread with access to the lock object can release an active write lock held by another thread. A second writer can then enter its critical section while the first writer is still running. Concurrent::ReadWriteLock#release_read_lock also decrements the shared counter even when no read lock is held. Calling it on a fresh lock changes the counter from 0 to -1, after which normal read acquisition raises Concurrent::ResourceLimitError. This is a synchronization correctness issue in the public Concurrent::ReadWriteLock API. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.3.7. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hfsplus: fix held lock freed on hfsplus_fill_super()
hfsplus_fill_super() calls hfs_find_init() to initialize a search
structure, which acquires tree->tree_lock. If the subsequent call to
hfsplus_cat_build_key() fails, the function jumps to the out_put_root
error label without releasing the lock. The later cleanup path then
frees the tree data structure with the lock still held, triggering a
held lock freed warning.
Fix this by adding the missing hfs_find_exit(&fd) call before jumping
to the out_put_root error label. This ensures that tree->tree_lock is
properly released on the error path.
The bug was originally detected on v6.13-rc1 using an experimental
static analysis tool we are developing, and we have verified that the
issue persists in the latest mainline kernel. The tool is specifically
designed to detect memory management issues. It is currently under active
development and not yet publicly available.
We confirmed the bug by runtime testing under QEMU with x86_64 defconfig,
lockdep enabled, and CONFIG_HFSPLUS_FS=y. To trigger the error path, we
used GDB to dynamically shrink the max_unistr_len parameter to 1 before
hfsplus_asc2uni() is called. This forces hfsplus_asc2uni() to naturally
return -ENAMETOOLONG, which propagates to hfsplus_cat_build_key() and
exercises the faulty error path. The following warning was observed
during mount:
=========================
WARNING: held lock freed!
7.0.0-rc3-00016-gb4f0dd314b39 #4 Not tainted
-------------------------
mount/174 is freeing memory ffff888103f92000-ffff888103f92fff, with a lock still held there!
ffff888103f920b0 (&tree->tree_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: hfsplus_find_init+0x154/0x1e0
2 locks held by mount/174:
#0: ffff888103f960e0 (&type->s_umount_key#42/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: alloc_super.constprop.0+0x167/0xa40
#1: ffff888103f920b0 (&tree->tree_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: hfsplus_find_init+0x154/0x1e0
stack backtrace:
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 174 Comm: mount Not tainted 7.0.0-rc3-00016-gb4f0dd314b39 #4 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x82/0xd0
debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x13a/0x180
kfree+0x16b/0x510
? hfsplus_fill_super+0xcb4/0x18a0
hfsplus_fill_super+0xcb4/0x18a0
? __pfx_hfsplus_fill_super+0x10/0x10
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? bdev_open+0x65f/0xc30
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? pointer+0x4ce/0xbf0
? trace_contention_end+0x11c/0x150
? __pfx_pointer+0x10/0x10
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? bdev_open+0x79b/0xc30
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? vsnprintf+0x6da/0x1270
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x157/0x740
? __pfx_vsnprintf+0x10/0x10
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x80
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? irqentry_exit+0x17b/0x5e0
? trace_irq_disable.constprop.0+0x116/0x150
? __pfx_hfsplus_fill_super+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_hfsplus_fill_super+0x10/0x10
get_tree_bdev_flags+0x302/0x580
? __pfx_get_tree_bdev_flags+0x10/0x10
? vfs_parse_fs_qstr+0x129/0x1a0
? __pfx_vfs_parse_fs_qstr+0x3/0x10
vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x320
fc_mount+0x10/0x1d0
path_mount+0x5c5/0x21c0
? __pfx_path_mount+0x10/0x10
? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0x116/0x150
? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0x116/0x150
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? kmem_cache_free+0x307/0x540
? user_path_at+0x51/0x60
? __x64_sys_mount+0x212/0x280
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
__x64_sys_mount+0x212/0x280
? __pfx___x64_sys_mount+0x10/0x10
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0x116/0x150
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
do_syscall_64+0x111/0x680
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7ffacad55eae
Code: 48 8b 0d 85 1f 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 8
RSP: 002b
---truncated--- |
| [This CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the
text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.]
To create and manage guests, domctl operations are used by the control
domain, a possible Xenstore domain, or by a domain controlling a
particular guest. Some of these operations may not be executed in
parallel, so a system-wide lock is used. The way that lock is acquired
is, however, not providing any fairness. This is CVE-2026-42489.
Furthermore, with XSM/Flask in use, the lock acquire will, for some
operations, occur ahead of any permission checking. This is
CVE-2026-42490. |
| [This CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the
text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.]
To create and manage guests, domctl operations are used by the control
domain, a possible Xenstore domain, or by a domain controlling a
particular guest. Some of these operations may not be executed in
parallel, so a system-wide lock is used. The way that lock is acquired
is, however, not providing any fairness. This is CVE-2026-42489.
Furthermore, with XSM/Flask in use, the lock acquire will, for some
operations, occur ahead of any permission checking. This is
CVE-2026-42490. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: Prevent potential deadlocks in zone write plug error recovery
Zone write plugging for handling writes to zones of a zoned block
device always execute a zone report whenever a write BIO to a zone
fails. The intent of this is to ensure that the tracking of a zone write
pointer is always correct to ensure that the alignment to a zone write
pointer of write BIOs can be checked on submission and that we can
always correctly emulate zone append operations using regular write
BIOs.
However, this error recovery scheme introduces a potential deadlock if a
device queue freeze is initiated while BIOs are still plugged in a zone
write plug and one of these write operation fails. In such case, the
disk zone write plug error recovery work is scheduled and executes a
report zone. This in turn can result in a request allocation in the
underlying driver to issue the report zones command to the device. But
with the device queue freeze already started, this allocation will
block, preventing the report zone execution and the continuation of the
processing of the plugged BIOs. As plugged BIOs hold a queue usage
reference, the queue freeze itself will never complete, resulting in a
deadlock.
Avoid this problem by completely removing from the zone write plugging
code the use of report zones operations after a failed write operation,
instead relying on the device user to either execute a report zones,
reset the zone, finish the zone, or give up writing to the device (which
is a fairly common pattern for file systems which degrade to read-only
after write failures). This is not an unreasonnable requirement as all
well-behaved applications, FSes and device mapper already use report
zones to recover from write errors whenever possible by comparing the
current position of a zone write pointer with what their assumption
about the position is.
The changes to remove the automatic error recovery are as follows:
- Completely remove the error recovery work and its associated
resources (zone write plug list head, disk error list, and disk
zone_wplugs_work work struct). This also removes the functions
disk_zone_wplug_set_error() and disk_zone_wplug_clear_error().
- Change the BLK_ZONE_WPLUG_ERROR zone write plug flag into
BLK_ZONE_WPLUG_NEED_WP_UPDATE. This new flag is set for a zone write
plug whenever a write opration targetting the zone of the zone write
plug fails. This flag indicates that the zone write pointer offset is
not reliable and that it must be updated when the next report zone,
reset zone, finish zone or disk revalidation is executed.
- Modify blk_zone_write_plug_bio_endio() to set the
BLK_ZONE_WPLUG_NEED_WP_UPDATE flag for the target zone of a failed
write BIO.
- Modify the function disk_zone_wplug_set_wp_offset() to clear this
new flag, thus implementing recovery of a correct write pointer
offset with the reset (all) zone and finish zone operations.
- Modify blkdev_report_zones() to always use the disk_report_zones_cb()
callback so that disk_zone_wplug_sync_wp_offset() can be called for
any zone marked with the BLK_ZONE_WPLUG_NEED_WP_UPDATE flag.
This implements recovery of a correct write pointer offset for zone
write plugs marked with BLK_ZONE_WPLUG_NEED_WP_UPDATE and within
the range of the report zones operation executed by the user.
- Modify blk_revalidate_seq_zone() to call
disk_zone_wplug_sync_wp_offset() for all sequential write required
zones when a zoned block device is revalidated, thus always resolving
any inconsistency between the write pointer offset of zone write
plugs and the actual write pointer position of sequential zones. |
| Metabase is data visualization software. Prior to versions 0.44.5, 1.44.5, 0.43.7, 1.43.7, 0.42.6, and 1.42.6, it was possible to circumvent locked parameters when requesting data for a question in an embedded dashboard by constructing a malicious request to the backend. This issue is patched in versions 0.44.5, 1.44.5, 0.43.7, 1.43.7, 0.42.6, and 1.42.6. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ubifs: Fix deadlock in concurrent rename whiteout and inode writeback
Following hung tasks:
[ 77.028764] task:kworker/u8:4 state:D stack: 0 pid: 132
[ 77.028820] Call Trace:
[ 77.029027] schedule+0x8c/0x1b0
[ 77.029067] mutex_lock+0x50/0x60
[ 77.029074] ubifs_write_inode+0x68/0x1f0 [ubifs]
[ 77.029117] __writeback_single_inode+0x43c/0x570
[ 77.029128] writeback_sb_inodes+0x259/0x740
[ 77.029148] wb_writeback+0x107/0x4d0
[ 77.029163] wb_workfn+0x162/0x7b0
[ 92.390442] task:aa state:D stack: 0 pid: 1506
[ 92.390448] Call Trace:
[ 92.390458] schedule+0x8c/0x1b0
[ 92.390461] wb_wait_for_completion+0x82/0xd0
[ 92.390469] __writeback_inodes_sb_nr+0xb2/0x110
[ 92.390472] writeback_inodes_sb_nr+0x14/0x20
[ 92.390476] ubifs_budget_space+0x705/0xdd0 [ubifs]
[ 92.390503] do_rename.cold+0x7f/0x187 [ubifs]
[ 92.390549] ubifs_rename+0x8b/0x180 [ubifs]
[ 92.390571] vfs_rename+0xdb2/0x1170
[ 92.390580] do_renameat2+0x554/0x770
, are caused by concurrent rename whiteout and inode writeback processes:
rename_whiteout(Thread 1) wb_workfn(Thread2)
ubifs_rename
do_rename
lock_4_inodes (Hold ui_mutex)
ubifs_budget_space
make_free_space
shrink_liability
__writeback_inodes_sb_nr
bdi_split_work_to_wbs (Queue new wb work)
wb_do_writeback(wb work)
__writeback_single_inode
ubifs_write_inode
LOCK(ui_mutex)
↑
wb_wait_for_completion (Wait wb work) <-- deadlock!
Reproducer (Detail program in [Link]):
1. SYS_renameat2("/mp/dir/file", "/mp/dir/whiteout", RENAME_WHITEOUT)
2. Consume out of space before kernel(mdelay) doing budget for whiteout
Fix it by doing whiteout space budget before locking ubifs inodes.
BTW, it also fixes wrong goto tag 'out_release' in whiteout budget
error handling path(It should at least recover dir i_size and unlock
4 ubifs inodes). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ks8851: Reinstate disabling of BHs around IRQ handler
If the driver executes ks8851_irq() AND a TX packet has been sent, then
the driver enables TX queue via netif_wake_queue() which schedules TX
softirq to queue packets for this device.
If CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT=y is set AND a packet has also been received by
the MAC, then ks8851_rx_pkts() calls netdev_alloc_skb_ip_align() to
allocate SKBs for the received packets. If netdev_alloc_skb_ip_align()
is called with BH enabled, then local_bh_enable() at the end of
netdev_alloc_skb_ip_align() will trigger the pending softirq processing,
which may ultimately call the .xmit callback ks8851_start_xmit_par().
The ks8851_start_xmit_par() will try to lock struct ks8851_net_par
.lock spinlock, which is already locked by ks8851_irq() from which
ks8851_start_xmit_par() was called. This leads to a deadlock, which
is reported by the kernel, including a trace listed below.
If CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT is not set, then since commit 0913ec336a6c0
("net: ks8851: Fix deadlock with the SPI chip variant") the deadlock
can also be triggered without received packet in the RX FIFO. The
pending softirqs will be processed on return from
spin_unlock_bh(&ks->statelock) in ks8851_irq(), which triggers the
deadlock as well.
Fix the problem by disabling BH around critical sections, including the
IRQ handler, thus preventing the net_tx_action() softirq from triggering
during these critical sections. The net_tx_action() softirq is triggered
once BH are re-enabled and at the end of the IRQ handler, once all the
other IRQ handler actions have been completed.
__schedule from schedule_rtlock+0x1c/0x34
schedule_rtlock from rtlock_slowlock_locked+0x548/0x904
rtlock_slowlock_locked from rt_spin_lock+0x60/0x9c
rt_spin_lock from ks8851_start_xmit_par+0x74/0x1a8
ks8851_start_xmit_par from netdev_start_xmit+0x20/0x44
netdev_start_xmit from dev_hard_start_xmit+0xd0/0x188
dev_hard_start_xmit from sch_direct_xmit+0xb8/0x25c
sch_direct_xmit from __qdisc_run+0x1f8/0x4ec
__qdisc_run from qdisc_run+0x1c/0x28
qdisc_run from net_tx_action+0x1f0/0x268
net_tx_action from handle_softirqs+0x1a4/0x270
handle_softirqs from __local_bh_enable_ip+0xcc/0xe0
__local_bh_enable_ip from __alloc_skb+0xd8/0x128
__alloc_skb from __netdev_alloc_skb+0x3c/0x19c
__netdev_alloc_skb from ks8851_irq+0x388/0x4d4
ks8851_irq from irq_thread_fn+0x24/0x64
irq_thread_fn from irq_thread+0x178/0x28c
irq_thread from kthread+0x12c/0x138
kthread from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jbd2: fix deadlock in jbd2_journal_cancel_revoke()
Commit f76d4c28a46a ("fs/jbd2: use sleeping version of
__find_get_block()") changed jbd2_journal_cancel_revoke() to use
__find_get_block_nonatomic() which holds the folio lock instead of
i_private_lock. This breaks the lock ordering (folio -> buffer) and
causes an ABBA deadlock when the filesystem blocksize < pagesize:
T1 T2
ext4_mkdir()
ext4_init_new_dir()
ext4_append()
ext4_getblk()
lock_buffer() <- A
sync_blockdev()
blkdev_writepages()
writeback_iter()
writeback_get_folio()
folio_lock() <- B
ext4_journal_get_create_access()
jbd2_journal_cancel_revoke()
__find_get_block_nonatomic()
folio_lock() <- B
block_write_full_folio()
lock_buffer() <- A
This can occasionally cause generic/013 to hang.
Fix by only calling __find_get_block_nonatomic() when the passed
buffer_head doesn't belong to the bdev, which is the only case that we
need to look up its bdev alias. Otherwise, the lookup is redundant since
the found buffer_head is equal to the one we passed in. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cgroup: Defer css percpu_ref kill on rmdir until cgroup is depopulated
A chain of commits going back to v7.0 reworked rmdir to satisfy the
controller invariant that a subsystem's ->css_offline() must not run while
tasks are still doing kernel-side work in the cgroup.
[1] d245698d727a ("cgroup: Defer task cgroup unlink until after the task is done switching out")
[2] a72f73c4dd9b ("cgroup: Don't expose dead tasks in cgroup")
[3] 1b164b876c36 ("cgroup: Wait for dying tasks to leave on rmdir")
[4] 4c56a8ac6869 ("cgroup: Fix cgroup_drain_dying() testing the wrong condition")
[5] 13e786b64bd3 ("cgroup: Increment nr_dying_subsys_* from rmdir context")
[1] moved task cset unlink from do_exit() to finish_task_switch() so a
task's cset link drops only after the task has fully stopped scheduling.
That made tasks past exit_signals() linger on cset->tasks until their final
context switch, which led to a series of problems as what userspace expected
to see after rmdir diverged from what the kernel needs to wait for. [2]-[5]
tried to bridge that divergence: [2] filtered the exiting tasks from
cgroup.procs; [3] had rmdir(2) sleep in TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE for them; [4]
fixed the wait's condition; [5] made nr_dying_subsys_* visible
synchronously.
The cgroup_drain_dying() wait in [3] turned out to be a dead end. When the
rmdir caller is also the reaper of a zombie that pins a pidns teardown (e.g.
host PID 1 systemd reaping orphan pids that were re-parented to it during
the same teardown), rmdir blocks in TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE waiting for those
pids to free, the pids can't free because PID 1 is the reaper and it's stuck
in rmdir, and the system A-A deadlocks. No internal lock ordering breaks
this; the wait itself is the bug.
The css killing side that drove the original reorder, however, can be made
cleanly asynchronous: ->css_offline() is already async, run from
css_killed_work_fn() driven by percpu_ref_kill_and_confirm(). The fix is to
make that chain start only after all tasks have left the cgroup. rmdir's
user-visible side then returns as soon as cgroup.procs and friends are
empty, while ->css_offline() still runs only after the cgroup is fully
drained.
Verified by the original reproducer (pidns teardown + zombie reaper, runs
under vng) which hangs vanilla and succeeds here, and by per-commit
deterministic repros for [2], [3], [4], [5] with a boot parameter that
widens the post-exit_signals() window so each state is reliably reachable.
Some stress tests on top of that.
cgroup_apply_control_disable() has the same shape of pre-existing race:
when a controller is disabled via subtree_control, kill_css() ran
synchronously while tasks past exit_signals() could still be linked to
the cgroup's csets, and ->css_offline() could fire before they drained.
This patch preserves the existing synchronous behavior at that call site
(kill_css_sync() + kill_css_finish() back-to-back) and a follow-up patch
will defer kill_css_finish() there using a per-css trigger.
This seems like the right approach and I don't see problems with it. The
changes are somewhat invasive but not excessively so, so backporting to
-stable should be okay. If something does turn out to be wrong, the fallback
is to revert the entire chain ([1]-[5]) and rework in the development branch
instead.
v2: Pin cgrp across the deferred destroy work with explicit
cgroup_get()/cgroup_put() around queue_work() and the work_fn. v1
wasn't actually broken (ordered cgroup_offline_wq + queue_work order
in cgroup_task_dead() saved it) but the explicit ref removes the
dependency on those non-obvious invariants. Also note the
pre-existing cgroup_apply_control_disable() race in the description;
a follow-up will defer kill_css_finish() there. |
| NVIDIA Display Driver for Windows and Linux contains a vulnerability where an attacker could leak held driver locks. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to denial of service. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: Fix potential ADE in loongson_gpu_fixup_dma_hang()
The switch case in loongson_gpu_fixup_dma_hang() may not DC2 or DC3, and
readl(crtc_reg) will access with random address, because the "device" is
from "base+PCI_DEVICE_ID", "base" is from "pdev->devfn+1". This is wrong
when my platform inserts a discrete GPU:
lspci -tv
-[0000:00]-+-00.0 Loongson Technology LLC Hyper Transport Bridge Controller
...
+-06.0 Loongson Technology LLC LG100 GPU
+-06.2 Loongson Technology LLC Device 7a37
...
Add a default switch case to fix the panic as below:
Kernel ade access[#1]:
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.6.136-loong64-desktop-hwe+ #4
pc 90000000017e5534 ra 90000000017e54c0 tp 90000001002f8000 sp 90000001002fb6c0
a0 80000efe00003100 a1 0000000000003100 a2 0000000000000000 a3 0000000000000002
a4 90000001002fb6b4 a5 900000087cdb58fd a6 90000000027af000 a7 0000000000000001
t0 00000000000085b9 t1 000000000000ffff t2 0000000000000000 t3 0000000000000000
t4 fffffffffffffffd t5 00000000fffb6d9c t6 0000000000083b00 t7 00000000000070c0
t8 900000087cdb4d94 u0 900000087cdb58fd s9 90000001002fb826 s0 90000000031c12c8
s1 7fffffffffffff00 s2 90000000031c12d0 s3 0000000000002710 s4 0000000000000000
s5 0000000000000000 s6 9000000100053000 s7 7fffffffffffff00 s8 90000000030d4000
ra: 90000000017e54c0 loongson_gpu_fixup_dma_hang+0x40/0x210
ERA: 90000000017e5534 loongson_gpu_fixup_dma_hang+0xb4/0x210
CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE)
PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE)
EUEN: 00000000 (-FPE -SXE -ASXE -BTE)
ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7)
ESTAT: 00480000 [ADEM] (IS= ECode=8 EsubCode=1)
BADV: 7fffffffffffff00
PRID: 0014d000 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3A6000-HV)
Modules linked in:
Process swapper/0 (pid: 1, threadinfo=(____ptrval____), task=(____ptrval____))
Stack : 0000000000000006 90000001002fb778 90000001002fb704 0000000000000007
0000000016a65700 90000000017e5690 000000000000ffff ffffffffffffffff
900000000209f7c0 9000000100053000 900000000209f7a8 9000000000eebc08
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000006 90000001002fb778
90000001000530b8 90000000027af000 0000000000000000 9000000100054000
9000000100053000 9000000000ebb70c 9000000100004c00 9000000004000001
90000001002fb7e4 bae765461f31cb12 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
0000000000000006 90000000027af000 0000000000000030 90000000027af000
900000087cd6f800 9000000100053000 0000000000000000 9000000000ebc560
7a2500147cdaf720 bae765461f31cb12 0000000000000001 0000000000000030
...
Call Trace:
[<90000000017e5534>] loongson_gpu_fixup_dma_hang+0xb4/0x210
[<9000000000eebc08>] pci_fixup_device+0x108/0x280
[<9000000000ebb70c>] pci_setup_device+0x24c/0x690
[<9000000000ebc560>] pci_scan_single_device+0xe0/0x140
[<9000000000ebc684>] pci_scan_slot+0xc4/0x280
[<9000000000ebdd00>] pci_scan_child_bus_extend+0x60/0x3f0
[<9000000000f5bc94>] acpi_pci_root_create+0x2b4/0x420
[<90000000017e5e74>] pci_acpi_scan_root+0x2d4/0x440
[<9000000000f5b02c>] acpi_pci_root_add+0x21c/0x3a0
[<9000000000f4ee54>] acpi_bus_attach+0x1a4/0x3c0
[<90000000010e200c>] device_for_each_child+0x6c/0xe0
[<9000000000f4bbf4>] acpi_dev_for_each_child+0x44/0x70
[<9000000000f4ef40>] acpi_bus_attach+0x290/0x3c0
[<90000000010e200c>] device_for_each_child+0x6c/0xe0
[<9000000000f4bbf4>] acpi_dev_for_each_child+0x44/0x70
[<9000000000f4ef40>] acpi_bus_attach+0x290/0x3c0
[<9000000000f5211c>] acpi_bus_scan+0x6c/0x280
[<900000000189c028>] acpi_scan_init+0x194/0x310
[<900000000189bc6c>] acpi_init+0xcc/0x140
[<9000000000220cdc>] do_one_initcall+0x4c/0x310
[<90000000018618fc>] kernel_init_freeable+0x258/0x2d4
[<900000000184326c>] kernel_init+0x28/0x13c
[<9000000000222008>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0xc/0xa4 |
| Improper Resource Locking vulnerability in Mitsubishi Electric MELSEC iQ-R Series R12CCPU-V firmware versions "16" and prior, Mitsubishi Electric MELSEC-Q Series Q03UDECPU the first 5 digits of serial No. "24061" and prior, Mitsubishi Electric MELSEC-Q Series Q04/06/10/13/20/26/50/100UDEHCPU the first 5 digits of serial No. "24061" and prior, Mitsubishi Electric MELSEC-Q Series Q03/04/06/13/26UDVCPU the first 5 digits of serial number "24051" and prior, Mitsubishi Electric MELSEC-Q Series Q04/06/13/26UDPVCPU the first 5 digits of serial number "24051" and prior, Mitsubishi Electric MELSEC-Q Series Q12DCCPU-V all versions, Mitsubishi Electric MELSEC-Q Series Q24DHCCPU-V(G) all versions, Mitsubishi Electric MELSEC-Q Series Q24/26DHCCPU-LS all versions, Mitsubishi Electric MELSEC-L series L02/06/26CPU(-P) the first 5 digits of serial number "24051" and prior, Mitsubishi Electric MELSEC-L series L26CPU-(P)BT the first 5 digits of serial number "24051" and prior and Mitsubishi Electric MELIPC Series MI5122-VW firmware versions "05" and prior allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service (DoS) condition in Ethernet communications by sending specially crafted packets. A system reset of the products is required for recovery. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/hns: Fix unlocked call to hns_roce_qp_remove()
Sashiko points out that hns_roce_qp_remove() requires the caller to hold
locks. The error flow in hns_roce_create_qp_common() doesn't hold those
locks for the error unwind so it risks corrupting memory.
Grab the same locks the other two callers use. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ublk: fix deadlock when reading partition table
When one process(such as udev) opens ublk block device (e.g., to read
the partition table via bdev_open()), a deadlock[1] can occur:
1. bdev_open() grabs disk->open_mutex
2. The process issues read I/O to ublk backend to read partition table
3. In __ublk_complete_rq(), blk_update_request() or blk_mq_end_request()
runs bio->bi_end_io() callbacks
4. If this triggers fput() on file descriptor of ublk block device, the
work may be deferred to current task's task work (see fput() implementation)
5. This eventually calls blkdev_release() from the same context
6. blkdev_release() tries to grab disk->open_mutex again
7. Deadlock: same task waiting for a mutex it already holds
The fix is to run blk_update_request() and blk_mq_end_request() with bottom
halves disabled. This forces blkdev_release() to run in kernel work-queue
context instead of current task work context, and allows ublk server to make
forward progress, and avoids the deadlock.
[axboe: rewrite comment in ublk] |
