| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Sensitive information disclosure due to improper token validation. The following products are affected: Acronis Cyber Protect 17 (Linux, Windows) before build 42587. |
| Sensitive information disclosure due to improper token validation. The following products are affected: Acronis Cyber Protect 17 (Linux, Windows) before build 42587. |
| LightSAML implements SAML 2.0 data model classes, XML serialization and deserialization, XML security, certificate support, and message bindings. Prior to 4.7.1 and 5.0.1, LightSAML and xmlseclibs disagree about which assertion an inbound SAML signature covers. `Response::deserialize` uses `manyElementsFromXml` to collect only direct-child `saml:Assertion` elements of `samlp:Response`, and `AssertionSignatureValidatorAction` validates their `ds:Signature` using an out-of-band trusted IdP credential resolved by Issuer, not a key from the document. `XMLSecurityDSig::validateReference()` removes the enveloped signature from the shared DOM, but `processRefNode()` resolves `Reference URI="#id"` document-wide through an XPath of the form `//*[@Id]` and takes `item(0)`, which need not be the assertion whose claims LightSAML consumes. An attacker who has captured one genuinely signed assertion, such as an earlier login response, can place its signature-stripped bytes earlier in `samlp:Extensions` and present a forged direct-child assertion with the same ID and copied genuine signature. Validation then covers the hidden genuine bytes while LightSAML surfaces unsigned attacker-controlled `Subject/NameID`, `Conditions`, and `Attributes`, enabling authentication bypass or privilege escalation even when signature validation is required. The behavior was confirmed in versions 5.0.0 and 4.6.1. This issue is fixed in versions 4.7.1 and 5.0.1. |
| In Progress® Telerik® Document Processing Libraries prior to version 2026.3.1027, improper verification of cryptographic signatures and improper certificate validation in RadPdfProcessing digital signature validation allow an unauthenticated attacker to cause signature validation to report forged content as unmodified and its signing certificate as valid via a crafted signed PDF document. |
| Business::GoCardless versions before 1.01 for Perl accept forged webhooks when a configured webhook secret is undef or empty.
signature_valid uses each configured secret as the HMAC key, and nothing rejects undef or an empty string, both of which Digest::SHA treats as an empty key. A secret read from an unset environment variable, or an empty entry in a list of rotated secrets, is used as is.
A remote attacker can sign a forged webhook with an empty key and have it accepted as sent by GoCardless. |
| The `GITEA_TOKEN` of a Gitea Actions job authenticates as the `gitea-actions` system user, and the `/api/v1/user` email and GPG key endpoints accepted that user, so a job could register an email address and a GPG key on it; without required email confirmation (the default) the address is stored as activated. Commit verification treats a key without a real owner as the instance signing key, so any user who can run a workflow job could make commits signed with their own key show as trusted and signed by the instance in every repository where they appear, including pull requests to repositories the user cannot write to. The impact is limited to the displayed signature status: enforcement such as required signed commits only checks that a signature is verified and is unaffected, and no access is gained. The `/api/v1/user` routes now reject system users. |
| A flaw was found in the SAML adapter component of Keycloak, which is used to secure applications with SAML-based authentication. The adapter fails to verify that the issuer of a signed SAML assertion matches the expected identity provider configured for the application. If multiple identity providers share the same trusted signing key, an attacker who controls one of those providers can create a validly signed assertion to log into the application as any user, potentially gaining full administrative control. |
| MinIO Signature V4 verification before RELEASE.2026-09-22T19-25-18Z accepts unsigned x-amz-* headers, letting a presigned PUT URL be escalated into a cross-bucket read. |
| Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability in Drupal Commerce Stripe allows Signature Spoof. This issue affects Commerce Stripe versions: from 0.0.0 to 1.4, from 2.0.0 to 2.2.3. |
| In mutt and neomutt the In-Reply-To email header field is not protected by cryptographic signing which allows an attacker to reuse an unencrypted but signed email message to impersonate the original sender. |
| GPUStack is an open-source GPU cluster manager for AI model serving and GPU instance provisioning. From 0.7.1 until 2.2.2, the /auth/saml/callback endpoint decoded SAML XML, used its NameID and attributes to resolve or provision a user, and minted a gpustack_session JWT without calling OneLogin_Saml2_Auth.process_response to verify the signature, issuer, audience, destination, or time conditions. Any network client could submit an identity for an existing user, including an administrator, or provision a new non-administrator account, even when SAML was not configured. Response and Assertion identifiers were not consumed, so captured signed responses could also be replayed. This issue is fixed in version 2.2.2. |
| A flaw was found in the Kerberos federation provider of Keycloak, an open-source identity and access management solution. When Kerberos password authentication is used without SPNEGO, the system fails to verify the identity of the Key Distribution Center (KDC) by requesting a server ticket. This allows an attacker on the same network to spoof the KDC and bypass the authentication process, potentially gaining unauthorized access to user accounts. |
| A flaw was found in the jwcrypto library, which is used for implementing Javascript Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) standards. The issue occurs when the library verifies a General JSON Serialization JWS using a set of keys. Due to a coding error, the library fails to correctly identify the specific key ID (kid) and may instead accept a signature made by any valid key in the set. This can allow an attacker with a valid key to bypass authorization checks in applications that rely on the key ID to identify specific tenants or users. |
| russh is a Rust SSH client and server library. From version 0.34.0-beta.1 until version 0.64.0, its SSH server does not require the signature algorithm in a public-key authentication signature to match the algorithm named in the authentication request. A client possessing an authorized RSA private key can announce rsa-sha2-512 while supplying a valid ssh-rsa SHA-1 signature, bypassing restrictions or producing misleading audit records when applications rely on the requested algorithm. A valid private-key signature remains required, and russh clients are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 0.64.0. |
| A Kafka broker using SASL/OAUTHBEARER with the default validator (sasl.oauthbearer.jwt.validator.class=DefaultJwtValidator) selects its implementation from configuration. When sasl.oauthbearer.jwks.endpoint.url is set, the validator verifies the JWT signature. When that URL is unset (the default) and no verification key resolver is supplied, DefaultJwtValidator silently falls back to ClientJwtValidator, which does not verify the JWT signature, algorithm, or issuer - and the broker starts with no warning or error. This is the residual of CVE-2026-33557, whose fix restored signature verification only on the path where the JWKS endpoint URL is set.
Impact:
A broker in this state accepts any structurally valid JWT, including "alg":"none" tokens. An unauthenticated remote attacker who can reach the listener can forge a token asserting any principal - including configured superusers - and gain full access to the cluster. Only brokers that enable SASL/OAUTHBEARER validation without a JWKS endpoint URL (and without a custom verification key resolver) are affected; brokers that set the URL verify signatures and are not affected. Unlike CVE-2026-110952 (issuer/audience not enforced by default), here no signature is verified at all.
Mitigation (all affected versions, no upgrade required):
Set sasl.oauthbearer.jwks.endpoint.url for every listener/mechanism that uses OAuthBearerValidatorCallbackHandler, or configure a signature-verifying sasl.oauthbearer.jwt.validator.class.
Resolution:
From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.1, and 4.4.0: a broker that would fall back to the non-verifying ClientJwtValidator fails to start with a ConfigException instead of running without signature verification (secure by default). |
| FreeSWITCH is a Software Defined Telecom Stack enabling the digital transformation from proprietary telecom switches to a software implementation that runs on any commodity hardware. Prior to 1.11.2, FreeSWITCH's inbound ICE handling accepted every connectivity check without cryptographically validating its STUN MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute. A network peer able to reach an ICE-enabled leg's media port could forge an ICE connectivity check without SDP credentials, nominate its own address, redirect RTP and DTLS traffic, and terminate the legitimate media path. On unencrypted legs this enables eavesdropping and media injection, while all WebRTC and SIP legs that negotiate ICE are in scope. Version 1.11.2 introduces the remediation, which requires ice_verify_message_integrity=true. |
| A flaw was found in rust-rpm-sequoia. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by providing a specially crafted Red Hat Package Manager (RPM) file. During the RPM signature verification process, this crafted file can trigger an error in the OpenPGP signature parsing code, leading to an unconditional termination of the rpm process. This issue results in an application level denial of service, making the system unable to process RPM files for signature verification. |
| Electrum 4.6.0 before 4.7.2 contains an authorization bypass in the external plugin loader, which executes a plugin's __init__.py module when the plugin is marked enabled in the config file, without verifying its plugin-password signature. A rogue local process with write access to the Electrum data directory can place plugin code in the plugins/ folder and mark it enabled, causing arbitrary code execution inside the Electrum process. |
| An issue with signature validation was addressed with improved checks. This issue is fixed in iOS 27.2 and iPadOS 27.2, macOS Golden Gate 27.2, tvOS 27.2, visionOS 27.2, watchOS 27.2. An attacker in a privileged network position may be able to impersonate a Kerberos KDC. |
| In neomutt and mutt, the To and Cc email headers are not validated by cryptographic signing which allows an attacker that intercepts a message to change their value and include himself as a one of the recipients to compromise message confidentiality. |
