| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvdimm/bus: Fix potential use after free in asynchronous initialization
Dingisoul with KASAN reports a use after free if device_add() fails in
nd_async_device_register().
Commit b6eae0f61db2 ("libnvdimm: Hold reference on parent while
scheduling async init") correctly added a reference on the parent device
to be held until asynchronous initialization was complete. However, if
device_add() results in an allocation failure the ref count of the
device drops to 0 prior to the parent pointer being accessed. Thus
resulting in use after free.
The bug bot AI correctly identified the fix. Save a reference to the
parent pointer to be used to drop the parent reference regardless of the
outcome of device_add(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: fix use-after-free in mana_hwc_destroy_channel() by reordering teardown
A potential race condition exists in mana_hwc_destroy_channel() where
hwc->caller_ctx is freed before the HWC's Completion Queue (CQ) and
Event Queue (EQ) are destroyed. This allows an in-flight CQ interrupt
handler to dereference freed memory, leading to a use-after-free or
NULL pointer dereference in mana_hwc_handle_resp().
mana_smc_teardown_hwc() signals the hardware to stop but does not
synchronize against IRQ handlers already executing on other CPUs. The
IRQ synchronization only happens in mana_hwc_destroy_cq() via
mana_gd_destroy_eq() -> mana_gd_deregister_irq(). Since this runs
after kfree(hwc->caller_ctx), a concurrent mana_hwc_rx_event_handler()
can dereference freed caller_ctx (and rxq->msg_buf) in
mana_hwc_handle_resp().
Fix this by reordering teardown to reverse-of-creation order: destroy
the TX/RX work queues and CQ/EQ before freeing hwc->caller_ctx. This
ensures all in-flight interrupt handlers complete before the memory they
access is freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86/mmu: Drop/zap existing present SPTE even when creating an MMIO SPTE
When installing an emulated MMIO SPTE, do so *after* dropping/zapping the
existing SPTE (if it's shadow-present). While commit a54aa15c6bda3 was
right about it being impossible to convert a shadow-present SPTE to an
MMIO SPTE due to a _guest_ write, it failed to account for writes to guest
memory that are outside the scope of KVM.
E.g. if host userspace modifies a shadowed gPTE to switch from a memslot
to emulted MMIO and then the guest hits a relevant page fault, KVM will
install the MMIO SPTE without first zapping the shadow-present SPTE.
------------[ cut here ]------------
is_shadow_present_pte(*sptep)
WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:484 at mark_mmio_spte+0xb2/0xc0 [kvm], CPU#0: vmx_ept_stale_r/4292
Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 4292 Comm: vmx_ept_stale_r Not tainted 7.0.0-rc2-eafebd2d2ab0-sink-vm #319 PREEMPT
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:mark_mmio_spte+0xb2/0xc0 [kvm]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mmu_set_spte+0x237/0x440 [kvm]
ept_page_fault+0x535/0x7f0 [kvm]
kvm_mmu_do_page_fault+0xee/0x1f0 [kvm]
kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x8d/0x620 [kvm]
vmx_handle_exit+0x18c/0x5a0 [kvm_intel]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xc55/0x1c20 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2d5/0x980 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0xb5/0x730
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x47fa3f
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: add proper RCU protection to /proc/net/ptype
Yin Fengwei reported an RCU stall in ptype_seq_show() and provided
a patch.
Real issue is that ptype_seq_next() and ptype_seq_show() violate
RCU rules.
ptype_seq_show() runs under rcu_read_lock(), and reads pt->dev
to get device name without any barrier.
At the same time, concurrent writers can remove a packet_type structure
(which is correctly freed after an RCU grace period) and clear pt->dev
without an RCU grace period.
Define ptype_iter_state to carry a dev pointer along seq_net_private:
struct ptype_iter_state {
struct seq_net_private p;
struct net_device *dev; // added in this patch
};
We need to record the device pointer in ptype_get_idx() and
ptype_seq_next() so that ptype_seq_show() is safe against
concurrent pt->dev changes.
We also need to add full RCU protection in ptype_seq_next().
(Missing READ_ONCE() when reading list.next values)
Many thanks to Dong Chenchen for providing a repro. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: fix UAF in xchk_btree_check_block_owner
We cannot dereference bs->cur when trying to determine if bs->cur
aliases bs->sc->sa.{bno,rmap}_cur after the latter has been freed.
Fix this by sampling before type before any freeing could happen.
The correct temporal ordering was broken when we removed xfs_btnum_t. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: tegra210-quad: Protect curr_xfer check in IRQ handler
Now that all other accesses to curr_xfer are done under the lock,
protect the curr_xfer NULL check in tegra_qspi_isr_thread() with the
spinlock. Without this protection, the following race can occur:
CPU0 (ISR thread) CPU1 (timeout path)
---------------- -------------------
if (!tqspi->curr_xfer)
// sees non-NULL
spin_lock()
tqspi->curr_xfer = NULL
spin_unlock()
handle_*_xfer()
spin_lock()
t = tqspi->curr_xfer // NULL!
... t->len ... // NULL dereference!
With this patch, all curr_xfer accesses are now properly synchronized.
Although all accesses to curr_xfer are done under the lock, in
tegra_qspi_isr_thread() it checks for NULL, releases the lock and
reacquires it later in handle_cpu_based_xfer()/handle_dma_based_xfer().
There is a potential for an update in between, which could cause a NULL
pointer dereference.
To handle this, add a NULL check inside the handlers after acquiring
the lock. This ensures that if the timeout path has already cleared
curr_xfer, the handler will safely return without dereferencing the
NULL pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: fix dma_free_coherent() pointer
dma_alloc_coherent() allocates a DMA mapped buffer and stores the
addresses in XXX_unaligned fields. Those should be reused when freeing
the buffer rather than the aligned addresses. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: fix devlink reload call trace
Commit 4da71a77fc3b ("ice: read internal temperature sensor") introduced
internal temperature sensor reading via HWMON. ice_hwmon_init() was added
to ice_init_feature() and ice_hwmon_exit() was added to ice_remove(). As a
result if devlink reload is used to reinit the device and then the driver
is removed, a call trace can occur.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc0fd4b5d
Call Trace:
string+0x48/0xe0
vsnprintf+0x1f9/0x650
sprintf+0x62/0x80
name_show+0x1f/0x30
dev_attr_show+0x19/0x60
The call trace repeats approximately every 10 minutes when system
monitoring tools (e.g., sadc) attempt to read the orphaned hwmon sysfs
attributes that reference freed module memory.
The sequence is:
1. Driver load, ice_hwmon_init() gets called from ice_init_feature()
2. Devlink reload down, flow does not call ice_remove()
3. Devlink reload up, ice_hwmon_init() gets called from
ice_init_feature() resulting in a second instance
4. Driver unload, ice_hwmon_exit() called from ice_remove() leaving the
first hwmon instance orphaned with dangling pointer
Fix this by moving ice_hwmon_exit() from ice_remove() to
ice_deinit_features() to ensure proper cleanup symmetry with
ice_hwmon_init(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xhci: sideband: don't dereference freed ring when removing sideband endpoint
xhci_sideband_remove_endpoint() incorrecly assumes that the endpoint is
running and has a valid transfer ring.
Lianqin reported a crash during suspend/wake-up stress testing, and
found the cause to be dereferencing a non-existing transfer ring
'ep->ring' during xhci_sideband_remove_endpoint().
The endpoint and its ring may be in unknown state if this function
is called after xHCI was reinitialized in resume (lost power), or if
device is being re-enumerated, disconnected or endpoint already dropped.
Fix this by both removing unnecessary ring access, and by checking
ep->ring exists before dereferencing it. Also make sure endpoint is
running before attempting to stop it.
Remove the xhci_initialize_ring_info() call during sideband endpoint
removal as is it only initializes ring structure enqueue, dequeue and
cycle state values to their starting values without changing actual
hardware enqueue, dequeue and cycle state. Leaving them out of sync
is worse than leaving it as it is. The endpoint will get freed in after
this in most usecases.
If the (audio) class driver want's to reuse the endpoint after offload
then it is up to the class driver to ensure endpoint is properly set up. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/sysfs: fix use-after-free in state_show()
state_show() reads kdamond->damon_ctx without holding damon_sysfs_lock.
This allows a use-after-free race:
CPU 0 CPU 1
----- -----
state_show() damon_sysfs_turn_damon_on()
ctx = kdamond->damon_ctx; mutex_lock(&damon_sysfs_lock);
damon_destroy_ctx(kdamond->damon_ctx);
kdamond->damon_ctx = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&damon_sysfs_lock);
damon_is_running(ctx); /* ctx is freed */
mutex_lock(&ctx->kdamond_lock); /* UAF */
(The race can also occur with damon_sysfs_kdamonds_rm_dirs() and
damon_sysfs_kdamond_release(), which free or replace the context under
damon_sysfs_lock.)
Fix by taking damon_sysfs_lock before dereferencing the context, mirroring
the locking used in pid_show().
The bug has existed since state_show() first accessed kdamond->damon_ctx. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: asus: fix UAF via HID_CLAIMED_INPUT validation
After hid_hw_start() is called hidinput_connect() will eventually be
called to set up the device with the input layer since the
HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT connect mask is used. During hidinput_connect()
all input and output reports are processed and corresponding hid_inputs
are allocated and configured via hidinput_configure_usages(). This
process involves slot tagging report fields and configuring usages
by setting relevant bits in the capability bitmaps. However it is possible
that the capability bitmaps are not set at all leading to the subsequent
hidinput_has_been_populated() check to fail leading to the freeing of the
hid_input and the underlying input device.
This becomes problematic because a malicious HID device like a
ASUS ROG N-Key keyboard can trigger the above scenario via a
specially crafted descriptor which then leads to a user-after-free
when the name of the freed input device is written to later on after
hid_hw_start(). Below, report 93 intentionally utilises the
HID_UP_UNDEFINED Usage Page which is skipped during usage
configuration, leading to the frees.
0x05, 0x0D, // Usage Page (Digitizer)
0x09, 0x05, // Usage (Touch Pad)
0xA1, 0x01, // Collection (Application)
0x85, 0x0D, // Report ID (13)
0x06, 0x00, 0xFF, // Usage Page (Vendor Defined 0xFF00)
0x09, 0xC5, // Usage (0xC5)
0x15, 0x00, // Logical Minimum (0)
0x26, 0xFF, 0x00, // Logical Maximum (255)
0x75, 0x08, // Report Size (8)
0x95, 0x04, // Report Count (4)
0xB1, 0x02, // Feature (Data,Var,Abs)
0x85, 0x5D, // Report ID (93)
0x06, 0x00, 0x00, // Usage Page (Undefined)
0x09, 0x01, // Usage (0x01)
0x15, 0x00, // Logical Minimum (0)
0x26, 0xFF, 0x00, // Logical Maximum (255)
0x75, 0x08, // Report Size (8)
0x95, 0x1B, // Report Count (27)
0x81, 0x02, // Input (Data,Var,Abs)
0xC0, // End Collection
Below is the KASAN splat after triggering the UAF:
[ 21.672709] ==================================================================
[ 21.673700] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in asus_probe+0xeeb/0xf80
[ 21.673700] Write of size 8 at addr ffff88810a0ac000 by task kworker/1:2/54
[ 21.673700]
[ 21.673700] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc4-g9773391cf4dd-dirty #36 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[ 21.673700] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
[ 21.673700] Call Trace:
[ 21.673700] <TASK>
[ 21.673700] dump_stack_lvl+0x5f/0x80
[ 21.673700] print_report+0xd1/0x660
[ 21.673700] kasan_report+0xe5/0x120
[ 21.673700] __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x1b/0x30
[ 21.673700] asus_probe+0xeeb/0xf80
[ 21.673700] hid_device_probe+0x2ee/0x700
[ 21.673700] really_probe+0x1c6/0x6b0
[ 21.673700] __driver_probe_device+0x24f/0x310
[ 21.673700] driver_probe_device+0x4e/0x220
[...]
[ 21.673700]
[ 21.673700] Allocated by task 54:
[ 21.673700] kasan_save_stack+0x3d/0x60
[ 21.673700] kasan_save_track+0x18/0x40
[ 21.673700] kasan_save_alloc_info+0x3b/0x50
[ 21.673700] __kasan_kmalloc+0x9c/0xa0
[ 21.673700] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x139/0x340
[ 21.673700] input_allocate_device+0x44/0x370
[ 21.673700] hidinput_connect+0xcb6/0x2630
[ 21.673700] hid_connect+0xf74/0x1d60
[ 21.673700] hid_hw_start+0x8c/0x110
[ 21.673700] asus_probe+0x5a3/0xf80
[ 21.673700] hid_device_probe+0x2ee/0x700
[ 21.673700] really_probe+0x1c6/0x6b0
[ 21.673700] __driver_probe_device+0x24f/0x310
[ 21.673700] driver_probe_device+0x4e/0x220
[...]
[ 21.673700]
[ 21.673700] Freed by task 54:
[ 21.673700] kasan_save_stack+0x3d/0x60
[ 21.673700] kasan_save_track+0x18/0x40
[ 21.673700] kasan_save_free_info+0x3f/0x60
[ 21.673700] __kasan_slab_free+0x3c/0x50
[ 21.673700] kfre
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: qat - flush misc workqueue during device shutdown
Repeated loading and unloading of a device specific QAT driver, for
example qat_4xxx, in a tight loop can lead to a crash due to a
use-after-free scenario. This occurs when a power management (PM)
interrupt triggers just before the device-specific driver (e.g.,
qat_4xxx.ko) is unloaded, while the core driver (intel_qat.ko) remains
loaded.
Since the driver uses a shared workqueue (`qat_misc_wq`) across all
devices and owned by intel_qat.ko, a deferred routine from the
device-specific driver may still be pending in the queue. If this
routine executes after the driver is unloaded, it can dereference freed
memory, resulting in a page fault and kernel crash like the following:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffa000002e50a01c
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
RIP: 0010:pm_bh_handler+0x1d2/0x250 [intel_qat]
Call Trace:
pm_bh_handler+0x1d2/0x250 [intel_qat]
process_one_work+0x171/0x340
worker_thread+0x277/0x3a0
kthread+0xf0/0x120
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
To prevent this, flush the misc workqueue during device shutdown to
ensure that all pending work items are completed before the driver is
unloaded.
Note: This approach may slightly increase shutdown latency if the
workqueue contains jobs from other devices, but it ensures correctness
and stability. |
| A use after free issue was addressed with improved memory management. This issue is fixed in macOS Golden Gate 27.2, macOS Sequoia 15.8.2, macOS Tahoe 26.7.2. An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination. |
| A use-after-free flaw was found in the X.Org X server and Xwayland in CreateSaverWindow(). A client can trigger a use-after-free read after changing window attributes and forcing the screen saver, leading to information disclosure. |
| A flaw was found in libsoup, a library for handling HTTP requests. This vulnerability, known as a Use-After-Free, occurs in the HTTP/2 server implementation. A remote attacker can exploit this by sending specially crafted HTTP/2 requests that cause authentication failures. This can lead to the application attempting to access memory that has already been freed, potentially causing application instability or crashes, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nbd: fix uaf in nbd_genl_connect() error path
There is a use-after-free issue in nbd:
block nbd6: Receive control failed (result -104)
block nbd6: shutting down sockets
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in recv_work+0x694/0xa80 drivers/block/nbd.c:1022
Write of size 4 at addr ffff8880295de478 by task kworker/u33:0/67
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 67 Comm: kworker/u33:0 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc5-syzkaller-00123-g2c89c1b655c0 #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: nbd6-recv recv_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:408 [inline]
print_report+0xc3/0x670 mm/kasan/report.c:521
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:634
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0xef/0x1a0 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:96 [inline]
atomic_dec include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:592 [inline]
recv_work+0x694/0xa80 drivers/block/nbd.c:1022
process_one_work+0x9cc/0x1b70 kernel/workqueue.c:3238
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3319 [inline]
worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf10 kernel/workqueue.c:3400
kthread+0x3c2/0x780 kernel/kthread.c:464
ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
nbd_genl_connect() does not properly stop the device on certain
error paths after nbd_start_device() has been called. This causes
the error path to put nbd->config while recv_work continue to use
the config after putting it, leading to use-after-free in recv_work.
This patch moves nbd_start_device() after the backend file creation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: idxd: Check availability of workqueue allocated by idxd wq driver before using
Running IDXD workloads in a container with the /dev directory mounted can
trigger a call trace or even a kernel panic when the parent process of the
container is terminated.
This issue occurs because, under certain configurations, Docker does not
properly propagate the mount replica back to the original mount point.
In this case, when the user driver detaches, the WQ is destroyed but it
still calls destroy_workqueue() attempting to completes all pending work.
It's necessary to check wq->wq and skip the drain if it no longer exists. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: atm: add lec_mutex
syzbot found its way in net/atm/lec.c, and found an error path
in lecd_attach() could leave a dangling pointer in dev_lec[].
Add a mutex to protect dev_lecp[] uses from lecd_attach(),
lec_vcc_attach() and lec_mcast_attach().
Following patch will use this mutex for /proc/net/atm/lec.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lecd_attach net/atm/lec.c:751 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lane_ioctl+0x2224/0x23e0 net/atm/lec.c:1008
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807c7b8e68 by task syz.1.17/6142
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6142 Comm: syz.1.17 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc1-syzkaller-00239-g08215f5486ec #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/07/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:408 [inline]
print_report+0xcd/0x680 mm/kasan/report.c:521
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:634
lecd_attach net/atm/lec.c:751 [inline]
lane_ioctl+0x2224/0x23e0 net/atm/lec.c:1008
do_vcc_ioctl+0x12c/0x930 net/atm/ioctl.c:159
sock_do_ioctl+0x118/0x280 net/socket.c:1190
sock_ioctl+0x227/0x6b0 net/socket.c:1311
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:893 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x4c0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
Allocated by task 6132:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4328 [inline]
__kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x27b/0x620 mm/slub.c:5015
alloc_netdev_mqs+0xd2/0x1570 net/core/dev.c:11711
lecd_attach net/atm/lec.c:737 [inline]
lane_ioctl+0x17db/0x23e0 net/atm/lec.c:1008
do_vcc_ioctl+0x12c/0x930 net/atm/ioctl.c:159
sock_do_ioctl+0x118/0x280 net/socket.c:1190
sock_ioctl+0x227/0x6b0 net/socket.c:1311
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:893 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x4c0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 6132:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 mm/kasan/generic.c:576
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x51/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2381 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4643 [inline]
kfree+0x2b4/0x4d0 mm/slub.c:4842
free_netdev+0x6c5/0x910 net/core/dev.c:11892
lecd_attach net/atm/lec.c:744 [inline]
lane_ioctl+0x1ce8/0x23e0 net/atm/lec.c:1008
do_vcc_ioctl+0x12c/0x930 net/atm/ioctl.c:159
sock_do_ioctl+0x118/0x280 net/socket.c:1190
sock_ioctl+0x227/0x6b0 net/socket.c:1311
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:893 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:893 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: lpfc: Avoid potential ndlp use-after-free in dev_loss_tmo_callbk
Smatch detected a potential use-after-free of an ndlp oject in
dev_loss_tmo_callbk during driver unload or fatal error handling.
Fix by reordering code to avoid potential use-after-free if initial
nodelist reference has been previously removed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: core: flush gadget workqueue after device removal
device_del() can lead to new work being scheduled in gadget->work
workqueue. This is observed, for example, with the dwc3 driver with the
following call stack:
device_del()
gadget_unbind_driver()
usb_gadget_disconnect_locked()
dwc3_gadget_pullup()
dwc3_gadget_soft_disconnect()
usb_gadget_set_state()
schedule_work(&gadget->work)
Move flush_work() after device_del() to ensure the workqueue is cleaned
up. |
