| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ata: sata_fsl: Fix use-after-free of host_priv on probe() failure
sata_fsl_host_stop() releases hcr_base and host_priv:
static void sata_fsl_host_stop(struct ata_host *host)
{
struct sata_fsl_host_priv *host_priv = host->private_data;
iounmap(host_priv->hcr_base);
kfree(host_priv);
}
->host_stop() is called by the driver core through the ata_host_stop()
devres action which ata_host_start() registers, so it is called both when
the device is unbound and when probe() fails after the host has been
started.
The error_exit_with_cleanup label of sata_fsl_probe() releases hcr_base
and host_priv as well, and it is reachable from the two
device_create_file() calls which are done after the host has been
activated. In that case sata_fsl_host_stop() runs on an already freed
host_priv, resulting in a use-after-free and a double iounmap()/kfree().
Add a separate error label for the failures happening after the host has
been activated, which only detaches the host and leaves hcr_base and
host_priv to sata_fsl_host_stop().
Note that ata_host_detach() is dropped from error_exit_with_cleanup, as
that label is now only reachable while host is still NULL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/pci: Fix double-free and NULL deref in zpci MSI domain cleanup
zpci_remove_parent_msi_domain() dereferences zbus->msi_parent_domain
unconditionally and does not clear it afterwards.
zpci_bus_create_pci_bus() removes the domain when pci_create_root_bus()
fails, then zpci_bus_release() removes it again on the last kref_put(),
reading ->fwnode from the freed irq_domain and freeing it twice.
If zpci_alloc_domain() or zpci_create_parent_msi_domain() fails, no domain
is created at all; zbus is kzalloc'd, so the same release path dereferences
NULL.
Return early when there is no domain, and clear the pointer after removing
one. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/pci: Fix MSI directed-mode teardown IRQ bit count
On s390 with directed interrupts enabled, zpci_msi_teardown_directed()
frees the platform's maximum number of MSI bits (zdev->max_msi) instead
of the actual allocated count (zdev->msi_nr_irqs). This corrupts the
shared IRQ bitmap used by all PCI functions, causing lost interrupts and
heap corruption. Fix zpci_msi_teardown_directed() to only free the
actual allocated IRQ bit count. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/pci: Fix resource leak in zpci MSI setup
If airq_iv_create() fails in __alloc_airq(), the zpci_sbv bit allocated
by airq_iv_alloc_bit() is never freed. This permanently leaks one of the
ZPCI_NR_DEVICES summary bits, reducing system capacity with each failed
device hotplug. In systems with repeated device insertion failures or
under memory pressure, all summary bits can be exhausted, preventing new
PCI devices from being added until reboot.
Add proper error handling to free the zpci_sbv bit and reset zdev->aisb
if the AIBV creation fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/pci: Fix use-after-free race in zpci floating interrupt cleanup
zpci_clear_irq() stops the adapter from raising new interrupts for the
function, but a zpci_floating_irq_handler() already running on another CPU
can still be scanning zdev->aibv when zpci_msi_teardown_floating() releases
it.
Clear the zpci_ibv[] entry so no further handler picks the vector up, then
wait for a grace period before releasing it. The handler runs inside the
rcu_read_lock() section that do_airq_interrupt() holds across
airq->handler(), so synchronize_rcu() drains any handler still in flight.
Release the vector and free the summary bit only after the grace period, so
neither can be reused while a reader still holds the old pointer.
zpci_ibv served both delivery modes, indexed by function under
FLOATING and by cpu under DIRECTED. Only the floating vectors are
published to and torn down under the interrupt handler, so split the
directed vectors out into zpci_dibv and annotate zpci_ibv __rcu, which
lets sparse check the accessors above. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/kprobes: Prevent kprobes on instructions with exception table entry
The mvcos exception handler ex_handler_ua_mvcos() decodes the faulting
instruction, assuming it is an mvcos instruction. In case the instruction
is kprobed the decoded instruction is a breakpoint instruction instead,
which leads to incorrect instruction decoding and potential register
corruption.
Fix this by simply preventing to set a kprobe on such instructions,
similar like arm64 is doing it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/probes: Fix wrong opcode for cgrb fixup
The last byte of the cgrb instruction is 0xe4, however the probes code
compares against 0xe6. Fix it. |
| Use-after-free after interrupted session shutdown.
The session extension records the filename of the executing script when a session starts. If a fatal error occurs in an application callback while the session variables are destroyed at shutdown, such as stream_close() of a user-defined stream wrapper, the pointer is retained after the request memory is freed, and a later request handled by the same worker can free the stale string. An attacker who can trigger such a failing cleanup may crash the worker or corrupt memory; code execution has not been demonstrated. This requires the filename to be allocated in request memory, for example when the script is not cached by OPcache.
This issue affects PHP versions 8.3.* before 8.3.37, 8.4.* before 8.4.28 and 8.5.* before 8.5.13. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/vmcp: Initialize full session info to zero
The cma_alloc bit as well as the response can contain old data.
cma_release will not free the kmalloced memory in that case and
the response code might leak kernel stack data to CAP_SYS_ADMIN
users. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/zcrypt: Fix and improve zcrypt reply message verification checks
Add or improve checks related to buffer sizes and reply sizes to the
handling of replies from the crypto cards for CCA, EP11 (AP message
type 6) and ICA (AP type 50) messages. The verification code related
to reply field length was not designed well and thus firmware
deficiencies could lead to unexpected behavior in the zcrypt device
driver. Thus improve the code to more closely inspect especially
length fields at message replies.
Add length validation before accessing reply message structures in
zcrypt_msgtype6_receive(), zcrypt_msgtype6_receive_ep11(), and
zcrypt_msgtype50_receive() to prevent out-of-bounds reads and
potential kernel memory disclosure.
Also rework these three functions to validate reply lengths more
carefully before copying data back into the request buffer. Use size_t
for length calculations, reject inconsistent reply sizes, and add
defensive handling for short invalid replies. For XCRB replies,
validate both reply segments and derive the effective message length
from the covered range instead of trusting only the second segment.
Additionally improve some of the later invoked evaluation functions
which further check the payload. Add comments about length assumptions
and for the type50 processing rework the payload processing completely
with removing a misplaced BUG_ON(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/zcrypt: Fix out-of-bounds ptr advance in cca_query_crypto_facility()
The FQ reply parser code blindly advanced the walk pointer by a length
value read directly from the hardware reply payload without checking
that the advance stayed within the allocated reply buffer. A corrupt
or malicious device response could push ptr beyond the cprbmem region,
causing an out-of-bounds dereference or kernel memory exposure via the
subsequent memcpy().
Fix this by tracking the remaining reply buffer space in a variable
and validating each device-supplied length field against it before
advancing or dereferencing the pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/zcrypt: Guard domain index uses against speculative bypass
The previous array_index_nospec() placement only covered the admin
permission check, leaving ap_test_config_usage_domain() and
ap_test_config_ctrl_domain() in the CCA path exposed to speculative
execution.
Move the sanitization to before all permission and config checks in
both the CCA and EP11 paths. Hold the sanitized domain value in
another variable so that the later use can choose to use either the
original value (subject to speculative execution) or the sanitized
value (which may in case of AUTOSEL_DOM reflect the wrong
value). Before that, check the domain value to be either AUTOSEL_DOM
or in range 0...AP_DOMAINS-1 and return with -EINVAL in case this check
does not pass. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: wacom: Advertise SW_MUTE_DEVICE capability prior to registration
Input subsystem guidelines require that device capabilities are advertised
before the input device is registered. The Wacom driver was violating
this by advertising the SW_MUTE_DEVICE capability post-registration in
wacom_set_shared_values() (and duplicating it in device-specific setup
cases).
Resolve this by moving the SW_MUTE_DEVICE capability setup to
wacom_setup_touch_input_capabilities() for all touch devices that support
it.
For generic touch devices whose capabilities depend on mute switch
usages parsed from a sibling Pen/Pad interface, defer registration
with -EPROBE_DEFER until the sibling has parsed its descriptors and
initialized shared capabilities. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: wacom: Fix Use-After-Free in wacom_intuos_pad
wacom_intuos_pad() accesses wacom->shared->touch_input locklessly
inside the interrupt handler context. If the Touch sibling device
is disconnected, wacom_remove_shared_data() clears 'touch_input'
outside any lock, creating a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU)
race condition where a preempted reader in interrupt context
dereferences the freed pointer, leading to a Use-After-Free.
Resolve this by introducing RCU protection for the touch_input
pointer:
- Annotate 'touch_input' in wacom_shared struct with __rcu
- Wrap all lockless readers in wacom_wac.c with guard(rcu)() and
rcu_dereference() using a unified wacom_report_touch_mute()
helper
- Update writers in wacom_sys.c using rcu_assign_pointer()
- Call synchronize_rcu() in wacom_remove_shared_data() to ensure
all active RCU readers have finished before the input device is
freed
Also wrap wacom_set_shared_values() and touch/pen assignments in
wacom_add_shared_data() inside the wacom_udev_list_lock to serialize
concurrent probe assignments, and verify that 'shared->touch == hdev'
before setting touch_input to prevent concurrent sibling probe state
desynchronization. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: wacom: Fix Use-After-Free in wacom_bamboo_pad
wacom_bamboo_pad_pen_event() accesses wacom->shared->pen locklessly
relative to wacom_remove_shared_data() which nullifies it. This
can lead to a Use-After-Free if the sibling device is removed while
events are being processed.
Resolve this by introducing RCU protection for pen and touch
pointers:
- Annotate 'pen' and 'touch' in wacom_shared struct with __rcu.
- Wrap lockless readers in wacom_bamboo_pad_pen_event() with
rcu_read_lock() and rcu_dereference().
- Update writers in wacom_sys.c using rcu_assign_pointer().
- Use rcu_dereference_protected for comparisons under
wacom_udev_list_lock.
- Also use rcu_access_pointer in wacom_sibling_pending() and
wacom_mode_change_work() to avoid warnings (while lockless access in
the latter remains a pre-existing issue). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: wacom: Redesign shared sibling data lifecycle
The Wacom driver coordinates state between sibling interfaces of
the same physical device using a shared structure 'wacom_shared'
inside 'wacom_hdev_data'. The driver kept a volatile representative
pointer 'data->dev' pointing to a sibling 'hid_device' for physical
path comparisons during sibling matching.
This pointer management is fragile. When the representative device
is disconnected, wacom_remove_shared_data() failed to clear/update
'data->dev', leading to a Use-After-Free vulnerability when
subsequent sibling probes dereference the dangling 'data->dev'
pointer.
Resolve this issue by redesigning the sibling data lifecycle:
- Eliminate the volatile 'data->dev' representative pointer
completely
- Redesign 'wacom_hdev_data' to store stable static copies of the
required attributes upon first allocation: 'phys' path string,
'vendor', 'product' IDs and the sibling's 'device_type'
- Use these static attributes for stable sibling matching in
wacom_are_sibling() and wacom_get_hdev_data()
This ensures sibling matching remains safe and stable even if
individual siblings are dynamically added or removed.
To secure the lifecycle against concurrent probe/disconnect races:
- Switch kref_put() to kref_put_mutex() in
wacom_remove_shared_data() to serialize refcount drops with list
traversal and lookup
- Modify wacom_release_shared_data() to assume the list lock is
already held
Also, do not accumulate the 'device_type' capability flag during
subsequent sibling probes. Keeping only the first probed sibling's
device_type exactly preserves the original sibling matching behavior
without introducing side effects. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
klist: avoid accesses after waking klist_remove()
klist_remove() waits until a node is unreferenced so that its caller can
free the containing object. klist_release() currently publishes
waiter->woken and wakes the waiter before its final accesses to the waiter
and node. klist_remove() can then return, allowing its stack waiter and
the containing object to be freed or reused while klist_release() is still
running. In particular, bus_remove_driver() can free drv->p while
__device_attach() walks the same bus klist with bus_for_each_drv().
On an arm64 Cortex-A72 system, an unpatched 7.2.0-rc3 kernel with
CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT=y and CONFIG_KASAN=y reproduced the bug through the
in-tree I2C/at24 path. KASAN reported a use-after-free in
klist_dec_and_del() reached from klist_next()/bus_for_each_drv() while
at24 was being unregistered.
Clear n_klist and take a task reference before publishing woken. Use
release/acquire accesses for that publication and wake the referenced
task. The task reference keeps the waiter task alive if it returns and
exits before wake_up_process(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rust: bug: pass TAINT_WARN to warn_slowpath_fmt() on UML
On UML, `warn_flags!` calls `warn_slowpath_fmt()` directly. Its third
argument is a taint number, but `warn_on!` passes its bug flags there.
As a result, `add_taint()` gets 2304 instead of 9 (`TAINT_WARN`). The
warning is not recorded: `/proc/sys/kernel/tainted` stays 0 after
`warn_on!` fires, where it should be 512. It also causes an
out-of-bounds write in `add_taint()`.
Pass `TAINT_WARN` directly, as C does on UML. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rust: configfs: fix data offset calculation for subsystem callbacks
`get_group_data()` chooses between `Group::<Parent>::container_of()` and
`Subsystem::<Parent>::container_of()` based on whether `this` represents
the root group of a configfs subsystem. It detects this by checking
`(*this).cg_subsys.is_null()`, but `link_group()` in `fs/configfs/dir.c`
unconditionally sets `cg_subsys` for every `config_group` attached anywhere
in a registered subsystem, including the subsystem's own `su_group`. The
only `config_group` with a NULL `cg_subsys` is the configfs root, on which
userspace cannot trigger callbacks. The check is therefore always false at
runtime, and the `Subsystem` branch is dead. Subsystem-level callbacks
reach the `Group` branch and may read `data` at the wrong offset.
Thus change the `is_root` check to correctly identify whether a group is a
root group by comparing `this` to `subsys.su_group`.
[ Andreas: Fix clippy warning on 1.85.0 by moving safety comment. ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/amdxdna: clear the mailbox channel pointer when starting it fails
aie2_create_context() allocates a mailbox channel, starts it, and on a
failed start frees it again:
hwctx->priv->mbox_chann = xdna_mailbox_alloc_channel(ndev->mbox);
...
ret = xdna_mailbox_start_channel(hwctx->priv->mbox_chann, ...);
if (ret)
goto free_channel;
...
free_channel:
xdna_mailbox_free_channel(hwctx->priv->mbox_chann);
hwctx->priv->mbox_chann keeps pointing at the freed channel. That
pointer is the driver's own test for whether a hardware context has a
usable channel: aie2_destroy_context() returns early on NULL,
aie2_sched_job_run() refuses to run a job on NULL, and the message
helpers return -ENODEV on NULL. A stale pointer passes all of them.
It matters on the restart path. aie2_hwctx_restart() calls
aie2_create_context() again on a hardware context that is already live,
after aie2_hwctx_stop() has torn its channel down, and the context
survives a failure there: aie2_sched_job_timedout() discards the return
value entirely, and aie2_hwctx_resume() only propagates it. What is
left is a live hardware context holding a freed channel, and every
later user of it takes the non-NULL branch:
- the next job submitted reaches xdna_mailbox_send_msg() on the freed
channel, via the !mbox_chann guard in aie2_sched_job_run(),
- a second command timeout reaches aie2_hwctx_stop() ->
aie2_destroy_context(),
- closing the device reaches aie2_hwctx_fini() ->
aie2_release_resource() -> xrs_release_resource() ->
aie2_xrs_unload() -> aie2_destroy_context(),
and aie2_destroy_context() then calls xdna_mailbox_stop_channel()
followed by xdna_mailbox_free_channel() on memory that was already
freed: a use-after-free, and a second free of the same channel.
The AIE4 management channel already does this correctly -
aie4_mailbox_start() clears ndev->aie.mgmt_chann right after freeing
it. Do the same here.
The create path itself is not affected: when aie2_xrs_load() fails,
xrs_allocate_resource() removes the solver node without calling
->unload, and aie2_hwctx_init() frees hwctx->priv, so the stale pointer
never outlives the structure holding it.
Starting a channel can fail today without this patch: the ring buffer
sizes firmware reports are rejected unless both are powers of two, and
request_irq() can fail. |