| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: misc: usbio: bound bulk IN response length to the received transfer
usbio_bulk_msg() copies bpkt_len = le16_to_cpu(bpkt->len) bytes out of
the bulk IN buffer (usbio->rxbuf, allocated with size usbio->rxbuf_len)
into the caller's buffer. bpkt_len is fully controlled by the device
and is only checked against ibuf_len; ibuf_len in turn is checked
against usbio->txbuf_len, not against rxbuf_len:
if ((obuf_len > (usbio->txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt))) ||
(ibuf_len > (usbio->txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt))))
return -EMSGSIZE;
txbuf_len and rxbuf_len are taken independently from the bulk OUT and
bulk IN endpoint wMaxPacketSize in usbio_probe(). A malicious or
malfunctioning device that advertises a large bulk OUT endpoint and a
small bulk IN endpoint (e.g. by claiming one of the quirk-free IDs such
as the Lattice NX33U, 0x2ac1:0x20cb) therefore makes ibuf_len, and
hence the device-supplied bpkt_len, exceed rxbuf_len. memcpy() then
reads up to txbuf_len - rxbuf_len bytes past the end of the rxbuf slab
object. The over-read bytes are handed back to the i2c layer and on to
user space through i2c-dev, disclosing adjacent slab memory; with KASAN
this is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read.
The number of bytes actually received is already known: act equals the
URB actual_length and is bounded by rxbuf_len. Reject any response
that claims more payload than was received, mirroring the existing
"act < sizeof(*bpkt)" check just above.
The control path (usbio_ctrl_msg()) is not affected: it uses a single
buffer (ctrlbuf) for both directions, so its analogous copy can never
leave the allocation.
Found by code review. The out-of-bounds read was confirmed under
AddressSanitizer with a faithful userspace model of usbio_bulk_msg()'s
receive path (an rxbuf_len-sized buffer, the same act/ibuf_len/bpkt_len
checks and the memcpy). A USB raw-gadget + dummy_hcd reproducer is
also available. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
partitions: aix: bound the pp_count scan to the ppe array
aix_partition() reads the physical volume descriptor into a fixed-size
struct pvd and then scans its physical-partition-extent array:
int numpps = be16_to_cpu(pvd->pp_count);
...
for (i = 0; i < numpps; i += 1) {
struct ppe *p = pvd->ppe + i;
...
lp_ix = be16_to_cpu(p->lp_ix);
pvd points at a single kmalloc()'d struct pvd whose ppe[] member holds a
fixed ARRAY_SIZE(pvd->ppe) (1016) entries, but the loop runs up to the
on-disk pp_count. pp_count is an unvalidated __be16 read straight from
the descriptor, so a crafted AIX image with pp_count larger than 1016
drives the loop to read pvd->ppe[i] past the end of the allocation (up
to 65535 entries, ~2 MB out of bounds).
The partition scan runs without mounting anything, when a block device
with a crafted AIX/IBM partition table appears (an attacker-supplied
image attached with losetup -P, or a device auto-scanned by udev), via
msdos_partition() -> aix_partition().
Clamp the scan to the number of entries the ppe[] array can hold. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix netfs_read_to_pagecache() to pause on subreq failure
Fix netfs_read_to_pagecache() so that it pauses the generation of new
subrequests if an already-issued subrequest fails. |
| Out-of-bounds Write and Improper Validation of Array Index vulnerability in Samsung Open Source TizenFX Samsung/TizenFX allows Overflow Buffers. |
| Error in handling the PlatformLangCodes UEFI variable could cause a buffer overflow, leading to resource exhaustion and failure. |
| An improper physical access control issue exists in ShizenBox2 (dev-conf). If exploited, an attacker with physical access to the product may execute bootloader commands without authentication. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix cancellation of a DIO and single read subrequests
When the preparation of a new subrequest for a read fails, if the
subrequest has already been added to the stream->subrequests list, it can't
simply be put and abandoned as the collector may see it. Also, if it
hasn't been queued yet, it has two outstanding refs that both need to be
put. Both DIO read and single-read dispatch fail at this; further, both
differ in the order they do things to the way buffered read works.
Fix cancellation of both DIO-read and single-read subrequests that failed
preparation by the following steps:
(1) Harmonise all three reads (buffered, dio, single) to queue the subreq
before prepping it.
(2) Make all three call netfs_queue_read() to do the queuing.
(3) Set NETFS_RREQ_ALL_QUEUED independently of the queuing as we don't
know the length of the subreq at this point.
(4) In all cases, set the error and NETFS_SREQ_FAILED flag on the subreq
and then call netfs_read_subreq_terminated() to deal with it. This
will pass responsibility off to the collector for dealing with it. |
| A vulnerability was identified in Tenda HG10 300001138. Impacted is the function formWlanSetup of the file /boaform/formWlanSetup of the component Boa Web Server. The manipulation of the argument ssid leads to buffer overflow. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. |
| A vulnerability was determined in Tenda HG10 300001138. This issue affects the function formLogin of the file /boaform/formLogin of the component Boa Web Server. Executing a manipulation of the argument Username can lead to buffer overflow. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. |
| There is a memory corruption vulnerability recently
discovered in NI LabVIEW that may result in information disclosure or arbitrary
code execution. Successful exploitation requires an attacker to get a
user to open a specially crafted VI. This vulnerability affects NI LabVIEW 2026 Q3 (26.3.0)
and prior versions. |
| There is a memory corruption vulnerability recently
discovered in NI LabVIEW that may result in information disclosure or arbitrary
code execution. Successful exploitation requires an attacker to get a
user to open a specially crafted VI. This vulnerability affects NI LabVIEW 2026 Q3 (26.3.0)
and prior versions. |
| There is a memory corruption vulnerability recently
discovered in NI LabVIEW that may result in information disclosure or arbitrary
code execution. Successful exploitation requires an attacker to get a
user to open a specially crafted VI. This vulnerability affects NI
LabVIEW 2026 Q3 (26.3.0) and prior versions. |
| A single crafted SSH message gives an unauthenticated network attacker an out-of-bounds stack write of attacker-controlled length and content against any application built on swift-nio-ssh. This vulnerability is addressed in swift-nio-ssh version 0.14.1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_ffa: Validate framework notification message layout
Framework notifications carry an indirect message in the shared RX
buffer. Validate the reported offset and size before using them, reject
zero-length payloads, and ensure that any non-header payload starts at
the UUID field rather than in the middle of the message header.
Use the validated offset and size values for both kmemdup() and the UUID
parsing path so malformed firmware data cannot drive an out-of-bounds
read or an oversized allocation. |
| DBI versions before 1.648 for Perl saved errors in a limited-sized buffer.
Error messages that were returned when RaiseError, PrintError or HandleError were set were written to a 200-byte buffer without a length limit.
Attackers that can influence the error text in an application can trigger a buffer overflow. |
| A vulnerability was found in TOTOLINK CP450 4.1.0. The impacted element is an unknown function of the file /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi. Performing a manipulation of the argument topicurl results in buffer overflow. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. |
| Incorrect boundary conditions in the Layout: Grid component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 155 and Thunderbird 155. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) cap PDIO scan in get_multiple at ADM1266_PDIO_NR
adm1266_gpio_get_multiple() iterates the PDIO portion of the
caller-supplied mask using
for_each_set_bit_from(gpio_nr, mask,
ADM1266_GPIO_NR + ADM1266_PDIO_STATUS) {
...
}
where ADM1266_PDIO_STATUS is the PMBus command code (0xE9, i.e. 233),
not the number of PDIO pins. The intended upper bound is
ADM1266_GPIO_NR + ADM1266_PDIO_NR = 25.
gpiolib hands in a mask sized for gc.ngpio (= 25 bits on this chip),
so the iteration walks find_next_bit() up to 242, reading up to 217
extra bits (a handful of unsigned-long words: four on 64-bit, seven
on 32-bit) of whatever lives past the end of the mask in the
caller's stack. Any incidental set bit in that range then drives a
set_bit(gpio_nr, bits) call that writes past the end of the
caller-supplied bits array too -- both out-of-bounds.
Substitute ADM1266_PDIO_NR for the constant so the scan stops at the
last real PDIO bit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) bounce blackbox records through a protocol-sized buffer
adm1266_pmbus_block_xfer() copies the device-supplied block payload
into the caller-provided buffer using the device-supplied length:
memcpy(data_r, &msgs[1].buf[1], msgs[1].buf[0]);
The helper does not know how large data_r is and trusts the device to
return at most one record's worth of bytes. adm1266_nvmem_read_blackbox()
violates that contract: it advances read_buff inside data->dev_mem in
ADM1266_BLACKBOX_SIZE (64-byte) strides while the helper is willing to
write up to ADM1266_PMBUS_BLOCK_MAX (255) bytes. A device that returns
more than 64 bytes on the trailing record (read_buff offset 1984 in
the 2048-byte dev_mem allocation) overflows dev_mem by up to 191 bytes
before the post-call
if (ret != ADM1266_BLACKBOX_SIZE)
return -EIO;
can reject the response.
Contain the fix in the caller without changing the helper signature:
read each record into a 255-byte local bounce buffer that matches the
helper's maximum output, validate the returned length, and only then
copy exactly ADM1266_BLACKBOX_SIZE bytes into the dev_mem slot. |
| Description
NGINX JavaScript (njs) has a vulnerability in the XML module's namespace prefix list parser, reachable through the xml.exclusiveC14n() method. An unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger it when an affected NGINX configuration passes an externally controlled XML namespace prefix list to that method. Both the njs and the QuickJS (qjs) engines are affected. A crafted prefix list causes an out-of-bounds write past the end of a heap allocation. With the njs engine, which is the engine used when the js_engine directive is absent, this corrupts adjacent objects and crashes the NGINX worker. With the QuickJS engine, the same call additionally leaks the prefix list on every invocation, causing worker memory to grow across requests. The official nginxinc/nginx-saml reference implementation is affected during SAML signature verification. It reads InclusiveNamespaces/@PrefixList from an untrusted SAML message and passes it to xml.exclusiveC14n() before the signature has been verified, so a valid SAML signature is not required. A crafted SAML Response, Assertion, LogoutRequest, or LogoutResponse is sufficient. Code execution has not been demonstrated and cannot be ruled out for all platforms, as the effect of the out-of-bounds write depends on conditions beyond the attacker's control.
Impact
This vulnerability allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service on the NGINX system, either through repeatable worker restarts or through worker memory growth or possibly trigger code execution. There is no control plane exposure; this is a data plane issue only.
Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated. |
