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Search Results (45 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-44500 | 2 Zcashfoundation, Zfnd | 4 Zebra, Zebra-chain, Zebra-network and 1 more | 2026-05-08 | 5.3 Medium |
| ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.4.0, prior to zebra-chain version 7.0.0, and prior to zebra-network version 6.0.0, several inbound deserialization paths in Zebra allocated buffers sized against generic transport or block-size ceilings before the tighter protocol or consensus limits were enforced. An unauthenticated or post-handshake peer could therefore force the node to preallocate and parse for orders of magnitude more data than the protocol intended, across headers messages, equihash solutions in block headers, Sapling spend vectors in V5/V4 transactions, and coinbase script bytes in blocks. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.4.0, zebra-chain version 7.0.0, and zebra-network version 6.0.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-40880 | 2 Zcashfoundation, Zfnd | 4 Zebra-consensus, Zebrad, Zebra-consensus and 1 more | 2026-04-27 | 8.1 High |
| ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.2, a logic error in Zebra's transaction verification cache could allow a malicious miner to induce a consensus split. By carefully submitting a transaction that is valid for height H+1 but invalid for H+2 and then mining that transaction in a block at height H+2, a miner could cause vulnerable Zebra nodes to accept an invalid block, leading to a consensus split from the rest of the Zcash network. This vulnerability is fixed in zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.2. | ||||
| CVE-2026-40881 | 2 Zcashfoundation, Zfnd | 4 Zebra-network, Zebrad, Zebra-network and 1 more | 2026-04-27 | 7.5 High |
| ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.0 and zebra-network version 5.0.1, when deserializing addr or addrv2 messages, which contain vectors of addresses, Zebra would fully deserialize them up to a maximum length (over 233,000) that was derived from the 2 MiB message size limit. This is much larger than the actual limit of 1,000 messages from the specification. Zebra would eventually check that limit but, at that point, the memory for the larger vector was already allocated. An attacker could cause out-of-memory aborts in Zebra by sending multiple such messages over different connections. This vulnerability is fixed in zebrad version 4.3.0 and zebra-network version 5.0.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-34202 | 2 Zcashfoundation, Zfnd | 4 Zebra, Zebra-chain, Zebra and 1 more | 2026-04-08 | 7.5 High |
| ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.0 and zebra-chain version 6.0.1, a vulnerability in Zebra's transaction processing logic allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to cause a Zebra node to panic (crash). This is triggered by sending a specially crafted V5 transaction that passes initial deserialization but fails during transaction ID calculation. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.3.0 and zebra-chain version 6.0.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-34377 | 2 Zcashfoundation, Zfnd | 4 Zebra, Zebra-consensus, Zebra and 1 more | 2026-04-07 | 8.1 High |
| ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.0 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.1, a logic error in Zebra's transaction verification cache could allow a malicious miner to induce a consensus split. By matching a valid transaction's txid while providing invalid authorization data, a miner could cause vulnerable Zebra nodes to accept an invalid block, leading to a consensus split from the rest of the Zcash network. This would not allow invalid transactions to be accepted but could result in a consensus split between vulnerable Zebra nodes and invulnerable Zebra and Zcashd nodes. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.3.0 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.1. | ||||