| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In addDragDropListener of WindowManagerService.java, there is a possible permission bypass due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit a path traversal vulnerability in the PCP pmproxy logger servlet using a crafted hostname. This allows arbitrary file and directory creation, potentially leading to a denial of service. |
| A physical occupant on an Android Automotive OS (AAOS) Multi-User Multi-Display (MUMD) passenger display can view sensitive Heads-Up Notification (HUN) content and execute actions for a secure passenger user (User N) without authenticating. This bypasses the PassengerKeyguard because the HUN system only checks the global keyguard state, which is tied to the driver's unlocked display, and the PassengerKeyguard implementation fails to suppress HUNs or intercept action PendingIntents. Consequently, private notification data is disclosed, and user-N actions are executed without credential verification. |
| Improper path validation vulnerability in the Gleam compiler's handling of git dependencies allows arbitrary file system modification during dependency download.
Dependency names from gleam.toml and manifest.toml are incorporated into filesystem paths without sufficient validation or confinement to the intended dependency directory, allowing attacker-controlled paths (via relative traversal such as ../ or absolute paths) to target filesystem locations outside that directory. When resolving git dependencies (e.g. via gleam deps download), the computed path is used for filesystem operations including directory deletion and creation.
This vulnerability occurs during the dependency resolution and download phase, which is generally expected to be limited to fetching and preparing dependencies within a confined directory. A malicious direct or transitive git dependency can exploit this issue to delete and overwrite arbitrary directories outside the intended dependency directory, including attacker-chosen absolute paths, potentially causing data loss. In some environments, this may be further leveraged to achieve code execution, for example by overwriting git hooks or shell configuration files.
This issue affects gleam: from 1.9.0-rc1 before 1.15.4 and from 1.16.0-rc1 before 1.16.0-rc2. |
| In checkDestination of SmsUsageMonitor.java, there is a possible permission bypass due to improper input validation. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In moveTaskToFrontLocked of ActivityTaskManagerService.java, there is a possible permission bypass due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In moveTaskToFrontLocked of ActivityTaskManagerService.java, there is a possible background activity launch due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In resolveToHeavyWeightSwitcherIfNeeded of ActivityStarter.java, there is a possible background activity launch due to a confused deputy. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In modpowF4 of avb_rsa.c, there is a possible signature verification bypass due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In updateNotificationChannel of PreferencesHelper.java, there is a possible ui obfuscation issue due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In parseMetaData of StagefrightMetadataRetriever.cpp, there is a possible denial of service due to a stack buffer overflow. This could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In navigateUpTo of ActivityClientController.java, there is a possible permission bypass due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In moveTaskToFrontLocked of ActivityTaskManagerService.java, there is a possible background application launch (bal) issue due to a confused deputy. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In decrypt of CryptoHalHidl.cpp, there is a possible use-after-free due to a race condition. This could lead to remote code execution with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In onOutputReceived of FrameDecoder.cpp, there is a possible out-of-bounds write due to a heap buffer overflow. This could lead to remote code execution with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In onPersistentGroupsChanged of WifiP2pServiceImpl.java, there is a possible permission bypass due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In multiple locations, there is a possible permission bypass due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (OS Command Injection) vulnerability in livebook-dev livebook allows command injection into generated deployment setup commands.
LivebookWeb.Hub.Teams.DeploymentGroupAgentComponent.docker_instructions/2 and LivebookWeb.Hub.Teams.DeploymentGroupAgentComponent.fly_instructions/4 in lib/livebook_web/live/hub/teams/deployment_group_agent_component.ex interpolate deployment group environment variable values into the generated Docker and Fly.io setup commands without shell escaping. The values originate from the deployment group configuration and reach the sinks through Livebook.Hubs.Dockerfile.online_docker_info/3.
Both sinks place the value inside a double-quoted shell word, so a value containing a command substitution such as $(...) or backticks is evaluated by the shell without any need to break out of the quoting, and a literal double quote terminates the quoted word and allows arbitrary further tokens. The generated command is displayed in the Livebook web interface with a copy button, so a user who copies it and runs it without reviewing it first executes the injected commands on their own machine, under their own account.
An attacker requires privileges sufficient to set deployment group environment variables, while the resulting code execution occurs on the machine of whoever runs the generated command. The Kubernetes instructions are not affected, because they render the same values into a YAML manifest with escaping rather than into a shell command.
This issue affects livebook: from 0.13.0 before 0.18.7 and from 0.19.0 before 0.19.9. |
| Origin Validation Error vulnerability in livebook-dev livebook allows untrusted notebook output JavaScript to trigger session-wide keyboard shortcuts, including forced evaluation of all cells and runtime restart.
Livebook's JS-view feature renders notebook-defined JavaScript inside a sandboxed, cross-origin iframe specifically because that JavaScript is untrusted. The trusted iframe shell in iframe/priv/static/iframe/v5.html forwards every keydown event fired in its own window to the parent page without consulting Event.isTrusted, so an event synthesized by the untrusted script through window.dispatchEvent is forwarded exactly as a genuine keystroke would be. The parent-side relay in assets/js/hooks/js_view.js reconstructs and re-dispatches it on the live page with no further validation, and because assets/js/hooks/session.js registers the global shortcut handler on the document in the capture phase, that handler acts on the replicated event regardless of how it was produced.
Sandboxed output JavaScript can therefore drive Livebook's session-wide keyboard shortcuts. Two of them reach LivebookWeb.SessionLive and execute immediately with no confirmation: the shortcut for queueing full evaluation runs every cell in the notebook, and the shortcut for reconnecting the runtime disconnects and reconnects it, discarding in-memory state. A third shortcut deletes the focused cell behind a confirmation dialog that the user can permanently dismiss, after which it too executes silently.
Forced full evaluation is the significant consequence, because it causes the notebook's own Elixir code to run without the user choosing to evaluate anything. A user who merely opens a notebook obtained from a third party, or reached from published documentation, can have its code executed on their runtime. Livebook also mirrors cell outputs to every connected client, so a malicious output triggers in a collaborator's browser as soon as it renders.
This issue affects livebook: from 0.5.0 before 0.18.7 and from 0.19.0 before 0.19.9. |
| Relative Path Traversal vulnerability in livebook-dev livebook allows an attacker-authored notebook to write a file with attacker-controlled content to an arbitrary path.
A .livemd notebook can declare file_entries metadata, each entry carrying a name. Every path that creates a file entry through the user interface validates that name with Livebook.Notebook.validate_file_entry_name/2, which requires a flat filename of alphanumerics, dashes, underscores and dots, ending in an extension. The import path does not: Livebook.LiveMarkdown.Import.file_entry_metadata_to_attrs/1 in lib/livebook/live_markdown/import.ex takes the name verbatim from the notebook source.
For a URL-type file entry, Livebook.Session.file_entry_cache_file/2 in lib/livebook/session.ex resolves that name beneath the session's temporary directory without checking that the result stays inside it, and Livebook.FileSystem.Utils.resolve_unix_like_path/2 collapses parent-directory segments while clamping only at the filesystem root. When the entry's content is requested and no cached copy exists, Livebook fetches the entry's URL and writes the response body to the resolved path, creating parent directories as needed. The attacker therefore controls both the destination and the contents of the written file, which may land anywhere the Livebook process can write. The same missing containment check is present in Livebook.Session.to_attachment_file_entry/2.
A victim who opens an attacker-supplied notebook and causes the entry to be fetched triggers the write within their own authenticated session; the attacker needs no account on the target instance. URL-type entries are also not placed under notebook stamping quarantine on import, so no warning is shown.
This issue affects livebook: from 0.11.0 before 0.18.7 and from 0.19.0 before 0.19.9. |