| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Net::IDN::Punycode versions before 2.590 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via quadratic insertion cost when decoding a long label in decode_punycode.
The XS backend inserts each decoded code point into a UTF-8 buffer and finds the insertion point by scanning that buffer from the start, one character at a time. The scan runs once per code point over the output built so far, so the cost is quadratic in the label length. The pure-Perl backend downgrades its input to bytes so that substr can index it directly, but takes its working copy before the downgrade, so when the input carries the UTF-8 flag every substr on the copy scans from the start, with the same quadratic cost.
Nothing bounds the label length in the to-Unicode direction. The 63-byte DNS limit is checked only when converting to ASCII, so domain_to_unicode and uts46_to_unicode pass an attacker-supplied label of any length to the decoder. |
| Net::IDN::Punycode::PP versions before 2.590 for Perl decode a truncated label to a name containing a character it never encoded in decode_punycode.
The pure-Perl decoder reads one digit at a time with four-argument substr and tests the result with defined to detect the end of the input. substr on an exhausted string returns the empty string rather than undef, so decoding continues past the end. The empty string converts to a digit value below the range, reducing the accumulator, and the decoder derives one extra code point and its position from it. The result is deterministic. The XS backend rejects the same label.
Net::IDN::Punycode uses this backend wherever the XS does not build.
The two backends disagree about what such a label means, so a sender can pick a label that one installation resolves to a name and another rejects. |
| Net::IDN::UTS46 versions before 2.590 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via quadratic punycode encoding of an overlong label before the length check in to_ascii.
to_ascii punycode encodes each label and only then applies the 63-byte DNS limit. encode_punycode in both backends follows the sample implementation in RFC 3492, whose outer loop runs once per distinct non-ASCII code point and scans the whole input each round, so a label of distinct non-ASCII characters costs the square of its length before the limit rejects it. Every ASCII conversion in the distribution, including domain_to_ascii and email_to_ascii, goes through to_ascii. |
| Net::IDN::Punycode versions before 2.590 for Perl hang, crash or return a wrong label via unvalidated malformed UTF-8 in encode_punycode.
Neither backend checks that its input is well-formed UTF-8, so a string with the UTF-8 flag set over malformed bytes, as the :utf8 PerlIO layer produces from any malformed input, reaches the encoder unchecked. On perl 5.32 and later the XS backend reports a malformed sequence with a length of `(STRLEN)-1`, so the scan steps back one byte instead of forward and never ends. On earlier perls the XS returns a valid label for a different name. The pure-Perl backend runs a regex over the flagged string. Depending on the bytes, it aborts with SIGBUS on perl 5.28 and later, dies with a panic, or returns a wrong label.
The documented conversion functions match the label against Unicode properties first and that match dies on such a string, so only a direct call to encode_punycode reaches the defect. The decoder is not affected.
A direct caller encoding attacker-supplied bytes hangs, crashes or gets a label for a name the input never held. |
| Catalyst::Seal versions before 0.03 for Perl allow one request to disable a path or route a later one past an authorization check via a dispatch memo keyed on the request path alone.
Catalyst::Seal replaces the dispatcher's prepare_action with a version that memoises how a path resolved: which dispatch type matched, at which level, and what was left over as arguments. The key is the request path and nothing else. Action roles that match on the method, content type, scheme or query make that resolution depend on state the key does not carry, so the memo answers for a request it was not built from.
A path that resolves to no action is memoised as well, and replaying that entry returns without consulting any dispatch type, so no action is set and the request fails. A GET of a path whose action is declared POST-only therefore disables that path for every later request, the correct POST included. An entry that did resolve replays the level the earlier descent reached. Where a POST-only action sits below a shallower action on the same path, a GET memoises the shallow route, and a later POST is dispatched there with an auto() guarding the deeper controller never running.
The memo is cleared only when an action is registered, which happens at setup, so an entry lasts for the life of the process, and its cap of 2048 entries bounds how many paths one caller can disable. In the configuration measured, the misroute lands on the less privileged action, so it is an authorization check not running rather than a privilege gain. |
| IO::Socket::SSL::SelfCertificate versions 1.00 for Perl contains malware which executes Python code from an obfuscated URL.
The generate_certificate runs a Python script saved as a certificate file. The pyhton script attempts to retrieve code from a hardcoded http URL that is obfuscated with base64 encoding and run the response body directly.
The impact is that arbitrary code can be invoked as the user, without a dropped script being saved on the affected host.
The releases have no test scripts nor build hooks. The intention may have been to trigger the payload after installation.
The dropper script is in lib/Crypt/SelfCertificate/sample/cert.pem.
This is similar to CVE-2026-95831 for the module Crypt::SelfCertificate.
The SHA-256 digests of the files are
ba24ee8ec3b7f47f65bed62e16fb413ace50653cf44bd8ea90914390922831e0 IO-Socket-SSL-SelfCertificate-1.00.tar.gz
821d38830e5eb8607738421c25ac25f59fff02a6ab67daa32fbd020429454dac IO-Socket-SSL-SelfCertificate-1.00/lib/IO/Socket/SSL/SelfCertificate/sample/cert.pem
d483cb7b23b7271cb11cf242bff4a2e1c02df0b9525eb0429abeea8961c399d5 IO-Socket-SSL-SelfCertificate-1.00-upload.tar.gz |
| Crypt::SelfCertificate versions from 1.01 through 1.05 for Perl contains malware which executes Python code from an obfuscated URL.
The generate_certificate runs a Python script saved as a certificate file. The pyhton script attempts to retrieve code from a hardcoded http URL that is obfuscated with base64 encoding and run the response body directly.
The impact is that arbitrary code can be invoked as the user, without a dropped script being saved on the affected host.
The releases have no test scripts nor build hooks. The intention may have been to trigger the payload after installation.
For version 1.01, the dropper script is in lib/Crypt/SelfCertificate/sample/validate.p12.
For version 1.05, the dropper script is in lib/Crypt/SelfCertificate/sample/cert7.pem.
The SHA-256 digests of the files are
fbff21f45ff748365062a5e36fb2d72558cad82a507a6f357f320b4fcdf07760 Crypt-SelfCertificate-1.01.tar.gz
27b2d2d3174ad771474fff2521f5084ec231e9218ea8c832515aef1cbd5897bc lib/Crypt/SelfCertificate/sample/validate.p12
9fdfa7d69b034b77d4510cda567e8da1e486ca81c7daaadc5732a45c41d71991 Crypt-SelfCertificate-1.05.tar.gz
27b2d2d3174ad771474fff2521f5084ec231e9218ea8c832515aef1cbd5897bc lib/Crypt/SelfCertificate/sample/cert7.pem |
| MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor.
parse_assertion in MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2 calls Net::SAML2::Binding::POST->new with no cacert, cert_text or anchors argument, then passes the returned XML to Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion->new_from_xml with the IdP signing certificate as cacert. In Net::SAML2 before 0.86 that certificate guards only encrypted assertions, so the signature on an unencrypted assertion is checked against the certificate the response itself carries.
An attacker starts a SAML login, then posts a response signed with a certificate of their own. The audience, InResponseTo and timestamp checks that follow are all satisfiable by the attacker, so the response authenticates any NameID it carries. |
| Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step.
server_start generates a fresh nonce and sends it in the challenge, and nothing later compares that value against the nonce the client returns. server_step derives the expected digest from the client's own parameters, so a response verifies whenever its digest matches the nonce it carries. The count table it also checks is keyed on the client-supplied nonce and starts empty in each new server object, so a captured first response, carrying `nc=00000001`, passes that too. RFC 2831 defines the nonce in the response as the value the server sent in the preceding challenge.
An attacker who observes one successful `qop=auth` exchange can replay the captured response against a later session for the same service, host, realm and user, and authenticate as that user without knowing the password. |
| Robots::Validate versions from 0.3.2 before 0.3.11 for Perl allow unbounded outbound DNS queries per validation via a forward-confirmation loop that does not bound the names it queries.
_check_dns issues one PTR query for the client address, keeps the returned names matching the rule's domain, and issues a forward query for each until one resolves back to that address. Nothing bounds that list, and a client controls the reverse zone for its own address, so it chooses how many names the PTR answer holds. Net::DNS refetches a truncated answer over TCP by default, so the 512-byte UDP payload does not cap it either.
Any client whose User-Agent matches a rule with a domain reaches _check_dns. Each forward name is distinct and client-chosen, so every query misses the local cache and is resolved against the authoritative servers for that domain. The queries are synchronous, so the caller is held until all of them answer or time out. |
| Net::DNS versions before 1.57 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via unbounded recursion in sig_data when re-encoding a message with a misplaced TSIG record.
sig_data signs a message by re-encoding it, and removes TSIG records only from the additional section. A TSIG decoded into the answer or authority section survives that step and is signed again, so encoding re-enters sig_data with no termination condition. Decoding does not reject such a message: a TSIG that is not the last record on the wire raises "misplaced or corrupt TSIG", but the error is caught, reported as a warning, and the record is left in the packet. RFC 8945 section 5.2 requires the message to be dropped.
The recursion is reached only when the decoded TSIG carries an empty MAC, since a MAC recovered from the wire short-circuits the signing step. It is reached only from code that re-encodes a message it decoded, such as a forwarder or a proxy. A decoded message that is never re-encoded is unaffected. Message direction does not matter: a query reaches the same path as a response.
Each cycle re-encodes the whole message, so fewer than 100 bytes on the wire exhaust available memory and terminate the process. |
| DBI versions before 1.648 for Perl saved errors in a limited-sized buffer.
Error messages that were returned when RaiseError, PrintError or HandleError were set were written to a 200-byte buffer without a length limit.
Attackers that can influence the error text in an application can trigger a buffer overflow. |
| DBI versions before 1.650 for Perl are vulnerable to code injection via caller-influenced Profile.
When a string is assigned to a DBI handle's Profile attribute, DBI splits it into path, package and arguments, and interpolates the package part in a string eval with no validation of the package name.
Any caller-influenced value that reaches the Profile attribute is therefore arbitrary Perl code execution, including calls to run system commands.
The Profile attribute can be set from three different sources that can carry untrusted data: the DBI_PROFILE environment variable, a direct attribute assignment, and a DSN driver-attribute clause dbi:Driver(Profile=>SPEC):db.
An attacker controlling any of those inputs runs arbitrary Perl in the host process. The strongest remote position is a network-exposed DBI::Gofer / DBI::ProxyServer whose per-request DSN reaches the Profile attribute, letting a client execute code on the broker host. |
| DBI versions before 1.650 for Perl have a heap overflow when preparsing SQL statements with an extreme number of placeholders.
The fix for CVE-2026-10879 did not allocate enough memory to handle approximately 1.2-million placeholders.
DBI version 1.650 sets a hard limit of 99,999 placeholders. |
| DBI versions before 1.650 for Perl read one byte out-of-bounds in preparse when deleting an initial SQL comment.
The preparse method normalises SQL and removes comments. When the SQL starts with a comment line, the deletion of that line during normalisation led to an out-of-bounds read by one byte. The result is a fault on memory-hardened builds and nondeterministic newline retention on normal builds. |
| DBI versions before 1.648 for Perl have a heap overflow when preparsing SQL statements with more than 9 binders.
The preparse method expands SQL placeholder characters to numbered binders of the form :pN, but only allocates three characters per binder in the buffer. Placeholders 10-99 require four characters, 100-999 require five characters, et cetera. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in the DBD::Pg (aka DBD-Pg or libdbd-pg-perl) module 1.49 for Perl might allow context-dependent attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified input to an application that uses the getline and pg_getline functions to read database rows. |
| Off-by-one error in the bzinflate function in Bzip2.xs in the Compress-Raw-Bzip2 module before 2.018 for Perl allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (application hang or crash) via a crafted bzip2 compressed stream that triggers a buffer overflow, a related issue to CVE-2009-1391. |
| The rmtree function in lib/File/Path.pm in Perl 5.10 does not properly check permissions before performing a chmod, which allows local users to modify the permissions of arbitrary files via a symlink attack, a different vulnerability than CVE-2005-0448 and CVE-2004-0452. |
| Double free vulnerability in Perl 5.8.8 allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and crash) via a crafted regular expression containing UTF8 characters. NOTE: this issue might only be present on certain operating systems. |
