| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Mobile Device Management allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| Use after free in Windows Modern Device Management (MDM) allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Improper access control in Windows HTTP.sys allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Creation of temporary file in directory with insecure permissions in .NET Aspire allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Outlook allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Outlook allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Outlook allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Incorrect authorization in Microsoft Office SharePoint allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| Use after free in Windows USB Driver allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Print Spooler Components allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Use after free in Windows exFAT File System allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Use after free in Windows Print Spooler Components allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.75, the same POST /api/mcp/fetch-tools endpoint (any authenticated user, lowest role) also accepts the stdio transport, which spawns the attacker-supplied command with attacker-supplied args and an environment merged over os.environ. The process executes on the shared backend host before MCP protocol validation fails — so side effects fire regardless of whether the command speaks MCP. This is a distinct weakness class and exploit primitive from the SSRF (Advisory 2) on the same endpoint, and needs a different fix (role gating / opt-in trust boundary rather than egress controls). This issue has been patched in version 0.0.75. |
| Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.73, the HTTP workflow node in Heym makes outbound HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validation of the target host or IP address. If a workflow author has already configured an HTTP node that targets internal addresses such as cloud metadata endpoints or private network hosts, and exposed the workflow with anonymous execution, an unauthenticated attacker can trigger the preconfigured SSRF sink. The same project has comprehensive SSRF protection in its MCP integration, which is absent from the HTTP node. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.73. |
| Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.71, Heym's workflow engine accepts an arbitrary Python code string in the playwrightCode field of a Playwright node. This string is written to a temporary .py file and executed directly by the backend process via subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, script_path]) with no sandboxing, AST validation, or role gate. Any authenticated user — including a freshly registered account — can achieve full remote code execution (RCE) on the backend host, running as the service process user (observed as root in the default Docker deployment). This issue has been patched in version 0.0.71. |
| Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, heym hardens one untrusted-code path but not its sibling. The Python tool executor (python_tool_executor.py) treats user code as untrusted and mandates a Docker sandbox (no network, read-only fs, non-root, no docker socket), failing closed. The skill executor (skill_python_executor.py) runs skill Python via a local backend subprocess with no Docker isolation — only a 512 MB RLIMIT and a 7-key env denylist — so a skill executes inside the backend execution context, with filesystem access, network egress, and non-denylisted environment variables that should not be exposed to untrusted/shared skills. In the shipped Docker config (backend runs as root + /var/run/docker.sock mounted), this escalates to host root. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70. |
| Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, POST /api/mcp/fetch-tools is reachable by any authenticated user (lowest role; no admin/workflow association) and fetches an attacker-supplied URL through the sse and streamable_http transports with no scheme / private-IP / allowlist / redirect guard. The transport error is reflected in the HTTP 422 response, giving a semi-blind SSRF oracle, and the attacker also controls the outbound request headers. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70. |
| Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, team-member management (add / remove / update) is gated only on team membership, not on the team creator/admin role — and TeamMember has no role column. Any non-creator member can seat an attacker account into the team; because credential team-shares are scoped only by TeamMember.user_id, the newly-added attacker can then decrypt every credential shared into that team (provider API keys, OAuth tokens. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70. |
| Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, get_workflow_template / get_node_template fetches a template by ID with no visibility / author / shared_with predicate, so any authenticated user can read (and use) any other tenant's private (visibility=specific_users) template — including its full node/edge graph and the email addresses it was shared with. The list endpoint enforces visibility correctly; the single-item get/use paths do not. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70. |
