| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A flaw was found in Netty. A remote attacker could exploit this by sending a specially crafted HTTP request that includes control characters within the chunk-size line. This bypasses the intended strict validation, allowing the attacker to inject arbitrary HTTP requests. This vulnerability can lead to HTTP request smuggling, potentially resulting in information disclosure or other unauthorized actions. |
| A flaw was found in Netty's HTTP/1 decoder. Incomplete validation of malformed Transfer-Encoding headers allows a remote attacker to perform HTTP request smuggling. By sending specially crafted HTTP requests, an attacker can inject arbitrary HTTP requests, potentially bypassing security controls or accessing unauthorized resources. |
| A flaw was found in WildFly Elytron. Password hashing and verification normalize input with Unicode NFKC, which can collapse fullwidth characters to ASCII equivalents. A remote attacker can more easily guess affected passwords by using an ASCII-only dictionary against accounts whose passwords were intended to include those non-ASCII characters, leading to unauthorized access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: fix swap entry corruption when clearing uffd-wp at fork()
copy_hugetlb_page_range() clears the uffd-wp bit of migration and hwpoison
entries with huge_pte_clear_uffd_wp(), which operates on the present-PTE
bit position. Swap entries keep the uffd-wp state elsewhere -- the
migration branch reads and sets it with pte_swp_uffd_wp() and
pte_swp_mkuffd_wp() -- and the present-PTE position falls into the swap
payload. On x86-64 it lands in the inverted swap offset, where a
naturally-aligned hugetlb PFN always has the affected bit set, so the
clear advances the encoded PFN by two pages.
No userfaultfd needs to be involved: the clear is guarded only by the
child VMA not being uffd-wp registered, so a plain fork() with an
in-flight hugetlb migration entry (or a poisoned hugetlb page) corrupts
the entry copied into the child. Instrumenting the clear and forking
after MADV_HWPOISON on a 2MB anon hugetlb page shows:
offset before=120e00
offset after =120e02
The fallout is mostly latent: rmap walks match migration entries by folio
range and remove_migration_pte() rebuilds the PTE from the folio, so a
within-folio PFN skew heals once migration completes. But any path that
re-encodes the corrupted offset -- e.g. hugetlb_change_protection()
rewriting a writable migration entry via
make_readable_migration_entry(swp_offset(entry)) -- propagates it.
Migration entries legitimately carry uffd-wp, so clear it with
pte_swp_clear_uffd_wp(), matching copy_nonpresent_pte() and
move_huge_pte().
A hwpoison entry, on the other hand, never carries the uffd-wp bit: it is
installed fresh by make_hwpoison_entry() (try_to_unmap_one() does not
preserve uffd-wp on the hwpoison path) and hugetlb_change_protection()
leaves hwpoison entries untouched. There was nothing to clear there, only
the corruption, so drop the clear entirely. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vmwgfx: use check_add_overflow for shader size+offset bound
vmw_shader_define() validates the user-supplied shader window against
its backing buffer with
(u64)buffer->tbo.base.size < (u64)size + (u64)offset
drm_vmw_shader_create_arg::offset is __u64 in the uapi; when it is
near U64_MAX the unsigned addition wraps and the resulting tiny value
passes the check. The unbounded offset is then stored in
res->guest_memory_offset and forwarded to host SVGA shader-create
commands.
Use check_add_overflow() to detect the wrap and compare the resulting
endpoint against the buffer size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ring-buffer: Fix event length with forced 8-byte alignment
When RB_FORCE_8BYTE_ALIGNMENT is true, rb_calculate_event_length()
reserves the space of event->array[0] for placing the data length and
rb_update_event() stores the data length in event->array[0]
accordingly. As a result the whole event length will add extra 4 bytes
for sizeof(event.array[0]) unconditionally.
But ring_buffer_event_length() only subtracts the
sizeof(event->array[0]) for events larger than RB_MAX_SMALL_DATA +
sizeof(event->array[0]). As a result, small events on architectures
with RB_FORCE_8BYTE_ALIGNMENT=true report a data length that is 4
bytes larger than expected.
To fix it, add the RB_FORCE_8BYTE_ALIGNMENT as a condition to subtract
the size of that length field whenever RB_FORCE_8BYTE_ALIGNMENT is
true.
This issue is observed in a riscv64 kernel with
CONFIG_HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS set to y, when we run ftrace selftest
trace_marker_raw.tc, we get the weird log: for cases where the id is
1..100, the number of data field is 8*N, but once id exceeds 100, the
number of data field becomes 8*N+4:
# 1 buf: 58 00 00 00 80 5e d1 63 (number of data field is 8*1)
...
# a buf: 58 ... (number of data field is 8*2)
...
# 64 buf: 58 ... (number of data field is 8*13)
# 65 buf: 58 ... (number of data field is 8*13+4)
After applying this change, the number of data field keeps being 8*N+4
consistently. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: use parsed transport offset in TCP state lookup
TCP state handling reparses the skb to find the TCP header. For IPv6 it
uses sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), while the surrounding IPVS code already
parsed the packet with ip_vs_fill_iph_skb() and has the real
transport-header offset in iph.len.
This makes TCP state handling look at the wrong bytes when an IPv6
packet carries extension headers. Use the parsed transport offset passed
down from ip_vs_set_state() when reading the TCP header.
For IPv4 and for IPv6 packets without extension headers, the passed
offset matches the previous value. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: ah6: validate routing header segments_left
AH6 rearranges routing-header addresses before computing or verifying the
ICV. ipv6_rearrange_rthdr() assumes that segments_left is not larger than
the number of addresses described by the routing header's hdrlen field.
That assumption does not hold for raw IPv6 HDRINCL packets. A packet with
hdrlen equal to 2 describes one address, but can carry an arbitrary
segments_left value. With segments_left equal to 255, the function moves
its address pointer 4,064 bytes backwards and passes a 4,064-byte length to
memmove(), resulting in an out-of-bounds access.
Validate the invariant locally before modifying the routing header or
performing any address-pointer arithmetic, and propagate malformed-header
errors to the existing AH6 input and output error paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: validate attr entry pointer before field access
xfs_attr3_leaf_verify_entry() accesses lentry/rentry fields (namelen,
valuelen) before checking if the entry pointer itself is within bounds.
If nameidx is crafted to point near the end of the buffer, these field
accesses can read out-of-bounds before the bounds check at
name_end > buf_end is performed.
Add explicit bounds checks for entry pointers before accessing their
fields. Use offsetof() to check that the start of the flexible array
member (nameval/name) is within bounds, which ensures all preceding
fields are safe to access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: core: fix OOB read of field->usage in hid_set_field()
hid_set_field() hands field->usage + offset to hid_dump_input() before
the guard that bounds offset:
hid_dump_input(field->report->device, field->usage + offset, value);
if (offset >= field->report_count) {
hid_err(...);
return -1;
}
Under CONFIG_DEBUG_FS hid_dump_input() dereferences that pointer, with
buf = hid_resolv_usage(usage->hid, NULL). The usage[] array is
allocated inline with the hid_field in hid_register_field() and holds
field->maxusage entries, so an offset past it reads off the end of the
kvzalloc()ed allocation and into a neighbouring object. Had the guard
run first, offset < report_count <= maxusage would already have confined
the pointer to the array.
A caller supplies such an offset today. picolcd_fb_send_tile()
validates only report->maxfield before issuing
hid_set_field(report->field[0], 11 + i, ...) for i = 0..31, so its
offsets are fixed at 11..42 and are never checked against the bound
field. When the device registers that field with fewer usages, the
framebuffer deferred-io work drives the read on every tile. KASAN
reports a 4-byte slab-out-of-bounds read in hid_dump_input() below
hid_set_field(), and the same boot logs "offset (1) exceeds
report_count (1)" from the guard that runs only afterwards.
Move the hid_dump_input() call below the guard. Because
field->maxusage >= field->report_count, the guard then establishes that
field->usage + offset lies inside the array before it is dereferenced,
for every caller and without changing behaviour on the valid path.
Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: hyperv: validate initial device info bounds
The Hyper-V synthetic HID host supplies SYNTH_HID_INITIAL_DEVICE_INFO
messages that contain a HID descriptor followed by the report descriptor
bytes. mousevsc_on_receive_device_info() trusts bLength and
wDescriptorLength without checking that the received packet contains both
byte ranges.
A malformed host or backend message can therefore make the guest read
past the received VMBus packet while copying the report descriptor. Pass
the received initial-device-info size into the parser and reject
descriptor lengths that exceed the packet.
Impact: A malicious Hyper-V host or backend can crash a guest by sending
a short initial device-info message with an oversized HID report
descriptor length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
selinux: reject a class permission count below its inherited common
security_get_permissions() maps an inherited common's permissions into
an array sized by the class's own permissions.nprim, but class_read()
takes that nprim verbatim from the policy image and never checks that it
covers the common. A class that inherits a common of N permissions while
declaring a smaller nprim is accepted, and on load the common's
permissions are written past the class-sized array -- an out-of-bounds
heap write.
Reject a class whose permission count is below its inherited common's.
Well-formed policies, where the class count already includes the
inherited permissions, are unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: evdev - sanitize event type index when fetching event masks
The user-supplied event type index passed to EVIOCGMASK / EVIOCSMASK
ioctls is used to index the static counts array in evdev_get_mask_cnt()
and client evmasks array in evdev_get_mask().
While the event type is architecturally bounded by EV_CNT, speculative
execution may mispredict bounds checks and perform out-of-bounds loads.
Sanitize the event type index in evdev_get_mask_cnt() branchlessly using
array_index_mask_nospec(). This clamps the index to 0 for safe array
access and forces the returned count to 0 speculatively when the index
is out of bounds.
We do not need additional array_index_nospec() calls in evdev_get_mask()
because evdev_get_mask_cnt() speculatively forces the count (and
resulting xfer_size) to 0 for out-of-bounds types, preventing any
speculative memory access to client evmasks array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_ncm: Use unsigned int for ndp_index
The variable ndp_index is declared as a signed integer, but it stores
the return value of get_ncm(), which is unsigned.
A malicious host can supply a large offset that overflows the signed
ndp_index, making it negative. Because ndp_index is compared against
unsigned bounds, this negative value bypasses sanity checks and leads
to an out-of-bounds read when calculating the address of the NDP
block (ntb_ptr + ndp_index).
Fix this by changing ndp_index to unsigned int to ensure consistent
unsigned comparisons throughout the function. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vt: add permission check for KDSKBMETA ioctl
KDSKBMETA modifies keyboard meta mode but lacks the !perm check that all
other keyboard setter ioctls in vt_k_ioctl() enforce, allowing a process
to change meta mode on a non-controlling console without authorization. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ima: fix out-of-bounds read in xattr_verify()
The digest-length check in xattr_verify() mixes int and size_t:
if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >=
iint->ima_hash->length)
sizeof() yields size_t, so the usual arithmetic conversions promote
the whole left-hand side to unsigned 64-bit before the subtraction
runs. For a truncated xattr this underflows instead of going negative:
a 1-byte IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG xattr (xattr_len == 1, hash_start == 1)
turns "1 - 1 - 1" into SIZE_MAX, which is trivially >= ima_hash->length.
The check then passes and the following memcmp() reads
iint->ima_hash->length bytes starting past the end of the buffer
vfs_getxattr_alloc() allocated for it.
Nothing upstream clamps xattr_len back into a safe range first:
ima_get_hash_algo() only special-cases xattr_len < 2 to pick a default
algorithm, and evm_verifyxattr() returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN rather than
failing when no HMAC key is loaded, so a truncated security.ima value
reaches the length check as-is.
Rewrite the comparison so every operand stays a signed int and no
implicit conversion to size_t can occur. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: reallocate update replies for mismatched IDs
ovs_flow_cmd_new() preallocates the optional reply skb before it takes
ovs_mutex and before it knows which existing flow will be updated.
That is normally fine because the skb is sized from the request flow
identifier. That identifier also becomes the inserted flow's identifier.
For updates, however, a request with a UFID may miss the UFID lookup and
then fall back to the flow key lookup. That lookup can legitimately find
an existing key-identified flow. UFIDs are optional and the flow key is
the primary identifier.
For echoed replies, ovs_flow_cmd_fill_info() writes the matched flow's
identifier, not the request identifier used for the preallocation. A short
request UFID can therefore leave too little room for the key identifier.
The fill can then fail with -EMSGSIZE and hit the BUG_ON(error < 0) in the
update path.
Once the update target has been resolved, reallocate the reply skb if the
matched flow needs a larger reply than the request identifier allowed. Do
this before replacing the actions so the request can still fail cleanly if
the rare extra allocation fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in WMM_param_handler()
WMM_param_handler() copies a fixed-size WMM parameter element out of a
received information element without checking that the element is long
enough, causing an out-of-bounds read for a short WMM IE.
The handler reads sizeof(struct WMM_para_element) (18) bytes at
pIE->data + 6, so it requires pIE->length to be at least 24
(WLAN_WMM_LEN), but it never validates the length. Two of its three
callers reach it after matching only the WMM OUI: OnAssocRsp() in
rtw_mlme_ext.c matches a 6-byte OUI, and join_cmd_hdl() matches a
4-byte OUI, before calling the handler. A vendor-specific IE carrying
the WMM OUI but a length between 6 and 23, placed in an association
response or in the IE blob handed to join_cmd_hdl(), passes the OUI
check and then makes the memcmp() and memcpy() at pIE->data + 6 read
past the end of the element. OnAssocRsp() parses a frame received from
the AP, so this is reachable from a remote peer.
The remaining caller in rtw_wlan_util.c already guards the handler with
"pIE->length == WLAN_WMM_LEN". Move the equivalent check into the
handler itself so every caller is covered; the sibling IE handlers in
the same parsing loop (HT_caps_handler(), HT_info_handler(),
ERP_IE_handler()) likewise bound their accesses by pIE->length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
keys: make keyring key-chunk byte order agree with keyring_diff_objects()
keyring_get_key_chunk() loads description bytes into the index chunk low
address first, while keyring_diff_objects() numbers the first differing
bit from the low end and folds the absolute byte index into the level
without removing the inline-prefix offset the level already carries.
The two disagree on byte order and bit position, so the array can be
told two keys first differ at a bit that does not differ in the chunk
the walker uses, letting crafted descriptions collide into one node.
Load the chunk in the order keyring_diff_objects() assumes and drop the
inline-prefix length when folding the byte index into the level. This
only changes the in-memory ordering used to place keys within a keyring;
add, search and read of non-colliding keys are unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (adt7470) Fix busy-loop and I2C flooding in update thread
When userspace configures 'auto_update_interval' to 0 via sysfs, the
background kthread executes schedule_timeout_interruptible(0), which
returns immediately.
If 'num_temp_sensors' is concurrently or previously set to 0, the
msleep_interruptible() delay inside adt7470_read_temperatures() also
becomes 0. This combination forces the background thread into a tight,
unbounded busy-loop, hogging the CPU and flooding the I2C bus with a
continuous stream of transactions.
Fix this vulnerability by raising the lower limit of the clamp_val in
auto_update_interval_store() from 0 to 500 milliseconds. This guarantees
a reasonable minimum sleep window between sensor updates, protecting the
system from intentional or accidental I2C bus denial of service. |
