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CVE Vendors Products Updated CVSS v3.1
CVE-2026-99770 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 5.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vc4: Publish the output fence outside of job_lock job_lock is taken by the V3D interrupt handler, so nesting an IRQ-unsafe lock under it creates an inversion. drm_syncobj_replace_fence() takes drm_syncobj::lock, which other paths acquire with interrupts enabled. For example, a thread interrupted while holding it blocks the handler on job_lock, and the handler can only make progress once the submit path releases job_lock, which it cannot do while waiting for drm_syncobj::lock. This is reported by lockdep: [ 188.139076] ======================================================== [ 188.139086] WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected [ 188.139096] 7.3.0-rc3-00067-gc4f3feeaf60f #67 Tainted: G C [ 188.139108] -------------------------------------------------------- [ 188.139116] swapper/0/0 just changed the state of lock: [ 188.139125] ffff0000054f8ff8 (&vc4->job_lock){-...}-{3:3}, at: vc4_irq+0xa8/0x28c [vc4] [ 188.139234] but this lock took another, HARDIRQ-unsafe lock in the past: [ 188.139242] (&syncobj->lock){+.+.}-{3:3} [ 188.139256] and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them. [ 188.139267] other info that might help us debug this: [ 188.139275] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 188.139284] CPU0 CPU1 [ 188.139291] ---- ---- [ 188.139299] lock(&syncobj->lock); [ 188.139312] local_irq_disable(); [ 188.139320] lock(&vc4->job_lock); [ 188.139335] lock(&syncobj->lock); [ 188.139350] <Interrupt> [ 188.139358] lock(&vc4->job_lock); [ 188.139372] *** DEADLOCK *** Hand the fence over after job_lock is dropped. The job can complete and drop exec->fence in that window, so take a reference first and publish through the local pointer, as exec may already be gone.
CVE-2026-99769 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 5.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vc4: Drop the BO reservations outside of job_lock vc4_queue_submit() calls drm_exec_fini() with job_lock held and interrupts disabled. Besides unlocking the reservations, drm_exec_fini() frees the object array with kvfree(), which asks for preemptible task context or a non-NMI interrupt, and may reach might_sleep() through vfree(). Considering that an array that exceeds a page can take the vmalloc fallback, call drm_exec_fini() once job_lock is dropped. The reservations are then held across the job kick, which is harmless as nothing in the completion path takes a BO reservation. Note that vc4_attach_fences() has to stay inside the critical section, as it walks exec, which the job done worker is free to release as soon as job_lock is dropped.
CVE-2026-99767 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 5.9 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm4: use a full socket for local errors xfrm4_local_error() passes skb->sk to inet_sk() and ip_local_error() without ensuring it points to a full socket. TCP SYN-ACK skbs can be owned by TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV request sockets. xfrm4_tunnel_check_size() already checks sk_fullsock() since commit 1620c88887b1 ("xfrm: Fix the usage of skb->sk"), so iptfs_is_too_big() is the only remaining IPv4 caller passing a request socket here: the sk it tests is the listener, while skb->sk is the request socket. When IP-TFS rejects such an skb because it exceeds its payload MTU, the local error path treats the request socket as a struct inet_sock. KASAN reports a slab-out-of-bounds read in ip_local_error() beyond the request_sock_TCP allocation. Resolve the skb owner with skb_to_full_sk() before accessing inet_sock state or reporting the error. This maps a request socket to its listener and rejects sockets that cannot be used as full sockets, matching what commit 6973a21ee73c ("ipv6: xfrm: use full sockets in local error paths") did for xfrm6_local_error().
CVE-2026-99765 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 5.9 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: Fix demo-mode dynamic ACL dev-entry UAF vs LUN teardown A demo-mode (generate_node_acls=1) login that allocates a dynamic NodeACL populates that ACL's per-LUN dev entries in core_tpg_add_node_to_devs() *before* the ACL is linked onto tpg->acl_node_list by target_add_node_acl(): core_tpg_check_initiator_node_acl(): ... core_tpg_add_node_to_devs(acl, tpg, NULL); /* builds deves */ target_add_node_acl(acl); /* only now listed */ The LUN teardown sweep, core_clear_lun_from_tpg(), enumerates only tpg->acl_node_list, so a dev entry whose ACL is still in the window above is invisible to the sweep and is never disabled. It is left on the se_lun->lun_deve_list after core_tpg_remove_lun() frees the se_lun; when the same unpacked_lun is later re-added and the se_lun is reallocated at the same address, the stale dev entry is rediscovered by target_nacl_find_deve() and core_enable_device_list_for_node() corrupts lun_deve_list: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free ... core_enable_device_list_for_node+0x5ce/0x880 core_tpg_add_node_to_devs+0x169/0x190 core_dev_add_lun+0x146/0x190 target_fabric_port_link+0xe9/0x1b0 configfs_symlink+0x381/0xae0 __x64_sys_symlink+0x55/0x80 The demo-mode login path that drives the ACL/dev-entry creation is reachable by an unauthenticated initiator; the colliding LUN add/remove is a local configfs operation. Commit 49cb77e297dc ("target: Avoid mappedlun symlink creation during lun shutdown") introduced se_lun->lun_shutdown and guarded the *explicit* ACL MappedLUN path (target_fabric_mappedlun_link()), but the demo-mode automatic path, core_tpg_add_node_to_devs() -> core_enable_device_list_for_node(), was never given the equivalent guard, and the publish-after-populate ordering in core_tpg_check_initiator_node_acl() was left unchanged. Fix it in three cooperating parts: 1) Publish the dynamic NodeACL onto acl_node_list *before* creating its dev entries, so the teardown sweep can observe them. 2) Refuse to attach a dev entry to an se_lun that is shutting down, checked under nacl->lun_entry_mutex -- the same lock the sweep takes -- so once the sweep has passed an ACL any later enable for that LUN observes lun_shutdown and skips it. 3) In core_enable_device_list_for_node(), insert the new dev entry onto lun->lun_deve_list while still holding nacl->lun_entry_mutex, in both the replace and the new-entry branch. Previously the entry was added to nacl->lun_entry_hlist under the mutex but to lun->lun_deve_list only after dropping it; with the ACL now published early, the sweep could take the mutex in that gap, find the entry on the hlist, core_disable_device_list_for_node() it (list_del() on the not-yet- linked lun_link succeeds and the entry is freed), and then the enable would list_add_tail() the freed entry back onto lun_deve_list. Linking both lists under the mutex makes enable and the sweep mutually exclusive, closing that window. core_tpg_add_node_to_devs() already ignores the return value of core_enable_device_list_for_node(), so a shutting-down LUN is simply skipped.
CVE-2026-99760 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 4.3 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: tt: ignore ROAM flag of received ADD changes A received TT change (OGM diff or full table response) with the ROAM flag but without DEL is handled by batadv_tt_global_add() like a ROAMING_ADV: * a newly created global entry gets BATADV_TT_CLIENT_ROAM and is therefore excluded from the global CRC. The sender has it in its local CRC and the receiver has to request the full table again * batadv_tt_global_purge_local() removes the local entry of the receiver. The receiver's own client is considered as roamed to the sender and frames for it are rerouted The ROAM flag only has a meaning together with DEL. Drop it on reception to keep it from populating the global table with a temporary ROAMING entry which is not part of the CRC - and therefore causing a CRC mismatch.
CVE-2026-99758 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 7.5 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: account for chunk padding in sctp_init_cause() sctp_init_cause() accepts a chunk when skb_tailroom() can hold the cause header and the payload. sctp_addto_chunk() then writes 0-3 bytes of padding before that header so the chunk stays 4-byte aligned. The check does not include the padding, and the following skb_put() calls skb_over_panic() from softirq. Count the padding sctp_addto_chunk() is about to write. The cause length on the wire stays the header plus the payload. Found by LLM inspection, triggered and tested the fix.
CVE-2026-99754 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 7.1 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: Verify the iSCSI ISID is null-terminated iscsi_parse_pr_out_transport_id() returns the ISID of a FORMAT CODE 01b TransportID as a pointer into the PERSISTENT RESERVE OUT parameter list, lowercased in place and never null-terminated. spc4r37 Table 508 requires the field to be null-terminated, but a non-conforming initiator can omit the NULL; when the ISID ends at the end of the received buffer, the pointer is not a C string. The registration code still consumes it as one: strcmp() in __core_scsi3_locate_pr_reg() and in the REGISTER AND MOVE path, and snprintf("%s") in __core_scsi3_do_alloc_registration(), which also reads its first 8 bytes unconditionally with get_unaligned_be64() - a NUL check does not bound that read. When the parameter list spans more than one page, transport_kmap_data_sg() maps it with vmap(), and the over-read walks off the end of the mapping into the vmalloc() guard page and oopses. Reproduced with a PR OUT REGISTER + SPEC_I_PT parameter list of exactly 8192 bytes whose final TransportID carries a 12-byte ISID without a terminating NUL: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc9000138c000 RIP: 0010:strcmp+0xc/0x30 Call Trace: __core_scsi3_locate_pr_reg+0xd3/0x120 [target_core_mod] core_scsi3_decode_spec_i_port+0x8fc/0x13a0 [target_core_mod] core_scsi3_emulate_pro_register+0x73c/0x900 [target_core_mod] ... iscsi_target_rx_thread+0xef/0x1d0 [iscsi_target_mod] With a single-page parameter list the buffer is a kmap() direct mapping, so the over-read continues into the physically adjacent page instead of faulting. snprintf("%s") then copies whatever follows the ISID in memory into pr_reg_isid, and PR IN READ FULL STATUS reports the registration back to any initiator, turning the over-read into an info leak of kernel heap contents. Reproduced with a 4096-byte parameter list whose last TransportID ends at the end of the buffer with a 4-byte ISID and no NUL, interleaved with I/O to populate adjacent pages: the READ FULL STATUS response returned the ISID as "0xleak" followed by raw bytes that were not part of the parameter list. The snprintf() into pr_reg_isid[PR_REG_ISID_LEN] caps the echoed ISID at 15 characters, so at most 11 bytes past the buffer are leaked per command, but the PR OUT command is not rate limited. Any initiator that can send PR OUT to an iSCSI-exported LUN can trigger either variant, including a guest via vhost-scsi. Require 8 bytes to remain after the ",i,0x" separator, and a NUL inside the rest of the descriptor, before the ISID pointer is returned. REGISTER AND MOVE fails with TCM_INVALID_PARAMETER_LIST; on SPEC_I_PT no target port claims the malformed TransportID, and the command fails the same way.
CVE-2026-99753 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 4.7 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/loongson: Fix double free on BO initialization failure If ttm_bo_init_validate() fails, it drops the buffer object's reference and cleans it up through the supplied destroy callback. lsdc_bo_destroy() releases the GEM object and frees the enclosing lsdc_bo, so freeing it again in lsdc_bo_create() causes a double free on a synchronous failure path. Let TTM own the cleanup after initialization has started and return the error directly. Keep the explicit free on drm_gem_object_init() failure, which occurs before ownership is passed to TTM. Tested on LS7A2000 by making drm_vma_offset_add() return -ENOSPC for one selected dumb-buffer creation. The error reached userspace, the destroy callback ran once, and no handle was published or tracked BO retained. Normal buffer creation, zeroing, mapping, readback and release passed. AI assistance was used for the ownership analysis, fix, fault-injection tools, build and test execution.
CVE-2026-99752 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 4.7 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/loongson: Handle buffer mapping failures when clearing a BO lsdc_bo_clear() ignores the return value from lsdc_bo_kmap() and writes to lbo->kptr unconditionally. When the first mapping of a newly allocated buffer fails, kptr is still NULL and the subsequent memset accesses it. Return the mapping error without touching the buffer and propagate it from lsdc_gem_object_create(). Install the GEM object functions before clearing so that drm_gem_object_put() can release the buffer correctly on failure. Do not add the failed object to the tracking list or return an uncleared buffer to the caller. Imported buffers still skip clearing, and successfully mapped buffers are cleared and unmapped as before. Tested on LS7A2000 with a one-shot range error in ttm_bo_kmap(). Its -EINVAL return reached userspace, the object was destroyed once, and no GEM handle was published. Normal create/map/zero/write/read/close cycles passed, with the tracked BO count and VRAM usage unchanged. AI assistance was used for the lifetime analysis, fix, fault-injection tools, build and test execution.
CVE-2026-99751 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 4.4 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix skb_pull() BUG in __bpf_redirect_neigh() The issue: This is a follow-up to the short link-layer header fixes from Eric. After vlan pop_eth, a privileged SCHED_ACT BPF program can call bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0) and then bpf_redirect_neigh(). __bpf_redirect_neigh() calls skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*ethh)) after checking only that mac_header < network_header. Nothing verifies that the MAC header is long enough, that it is linear, or that the IP header the redirect goes on to read is linear either. A SCHED_ACT BPF program can do: bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0); bpf_redirect_neigh(lo, NULL, 0, 0); after vlan pop_eth. The skb then has mac_len == 1 and only one byte of linear data; skb_pull(ETH_HLEN) trips the skb->len < skb->data_len BUG in __skb_pull(): kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2839! RIP: skb_pull+0x40/0x50 Call Trace: skb_do_redirect -> packet_xmit -> packet_sendmsg Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt The v4 and v6 paths read ip_hdr() and ipv6_hdr() as soon as the MAC header is gone. On the AF_PACKET frame below that leaves headlen == 0 after the pull, so the network header sits at skb->tail and the route lookup reads ip4h->protocol, ip4h->saddr and ip4h->daddr past the linear area. The Fix: Use skb_network_offset(), which is the MAC header span, instead of skb->mac_len. mac_len is zero for locally generated tc egress and netkit packets, while the span still rejects the one-byte header produced by pop_eth + bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0). The single check also covers the mac_header >= network_header test it replaces. Use pskb_may_pull() to make the Ethernet header linear before it is read or pulled, and to make the IP header linear in both the v4 and the v6 path before ip_hdr()/ipv6_hdr() is read. The header pointers are taken after the pull, since pskb_may_pull() may reallocate skb->head. Conditions to recreate the bug: On x86-64 with 4 KiB pages, enable CONFIG_PACKET, CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL, CONFIG_NET_SCH_INGRESS, CONFIG_NET_CLS_MATCHALL, CONFIG_NET_ACT_VLAN and CONFIG_NET_ACT_BPF. Run as root with BPF loading, network administration and raw-packet privileges. Bring lo up and attach a SCHED_ACT program that calls bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0), then returns bpf_redirect_neigh(skb->ifindex, NULL, 0, 0): ip link set lo up tc qdisc add dev lo clsact tc filter add dev lo egress matchall action vlan pop_eth pipe \ action bpf object-file neigh_chghead.o section action Send an untagged ETH_P_IP frame of ETH_HLEN + 8192 bytes through an AF_PACKET/SOCK_RAW socket bound to lo, without PACKET_VNET_HDR or PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS. Use a unicast destination MAC. The sender's skb has a 14-byte linear Ethernet prefix and a fragmented payload; pop_eth removes that prefix and change_head restores only one linear byte. The unfixed neighbor redirect then tries to pull 14 bytes and BUGs. Sending the same frame without pop_eth and change_head leaves the IP header in the frags, which is the route lookup reading past skb->tail.
CVE-2026-99745 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 4.7 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/bugs: Select the BHI mitigation based on the attack vector properly The BHI mitigation selection is inconsistent with the documentation (attack_vector_controls.rst), which lists BHI under both the user->kernel and guest->host attack vectors. bhi_select_mitigation() only enables it when CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST is set; otherwise it selects BHI_MITIGATION_OFF, even if CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL is set. As a result, a kernel compiled with KVM disabled gets BHI automatically disabled, since CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST defaults to off without KVM. This is a bug, given that CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL still needs it: on affected Intel CPUs these kernels lose BHI_DIS_S or the BHB clearing loop by default. Booting with mitigations=auto,no_guest_host has the same effect. Select BHI_MITIGATION_ON whenever user->kernel is mitigated, and keep BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY for the guest->host-only case. [ bp: Clarify commit title. ]
CVE-2026-99742 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 5.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/mempolicy: charge shared policy nodes Any local user can bypass memory.max with mbind() on a tmpfs file, and allocate unbounded kernel memory. mbind() sets a NUMA memory policy for a range of a mapping. If the mapping is of a shmem and friends, the kernel also stores the policy on the inode, in a tree with one entry per range of the file. Each mbind() on a single page of a mapping can add one shared policy node (struct sp_node) and one struct mempolicy to that tree. They outlive the mapping and stay around until the inode is destroyed. The tree is not bounded by the file size, so the file can be empty. Memory that user space can allocate must be charged to a memory cgroup. A slab cache does that for all of its objects if it is created with SLAB_ACCOUNT. numa_policy_init() creates the slab caches for both structs without SLAB_ACCOUNT, so they are not charged to any cgroup. Reproduced with mbind() on single pages of an empty tmpfs file, from a cgroup with memory.max=8M: the global OOM killer killed tasks owned by root, and the machine panicked. Fix this by creating both caches with SLAB_ACCOUNT. This change implies that mbind() can now fail when running into memcg limits. Further, the policy_cache also serves task and VMA policies, so they are similarly accounted now. Note that per-file limits are not really helpful, as the user could simply use many files; having limits per user is tricky as well. Fix generated by an LLM and submitted by Chris Mason in private. [ david: smaller description tweaks ]
CVE-2026-99741 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 3.3 Low
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tmpfs: keep the quota soft limits of an unused id When the last reference to a dquot goes away, shmem_release_dquot() stores its limits in the rb tree of the mount, unless shmem_is_empty_dquot() says that there is nothing worth storing. That function looks at the usage and at the two hard limits only. So if the administrator sets nothing but soft limits for an id that owns no file yet, the entry is thrown away as soon as the dquot that Q_SETQUOTA used is released, and the id never gets to see a limit. To fix it, compare the soft limits as well: an entry can be empty only if both soft limits are zero as well, which is exactly what shmem_acquire_dquot() sets for a new entry. Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Josef Bacik in private. [ david: slightly adjusted description ]
CVE-2026-99737 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 4.7 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/shmem: fix truncate loop after boundary swapin failure If swapping in a large entry at the new EOF fails, shmem_undo_range() leaves the entry in place. Its final scan skips the entry, then restarts from the same start index and finds it again. Truncation can loop forever while holding i_rwsem. Advance start past the skipped entry so that a restarted scan can finish, as we already do for folios that cannot be split. Note that this does not fix the missing zeroing when boundary swapin fails, it merely prevents the endless loop.
CVE-2026-99735 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 4.7 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/mglru: don't use stack pointers when walking PUD and PMD tables MGLRU passes stack copies of page-table entries in walk_pud_range() and walk_pmd_range() when walking to the next level. These copies can become stale when khugepaged or MADV_DONTNEED (CONFIG_PT_RECLAIM) removes a PTE table concurrently. This pattern dates back to commit bd74fdaea146 ("mm: multi-gen LRU: support page table walks"). Likely, earlier locking masked the latent bug. Later changes exposed it: commit 1d65b771bc08 ("mm/khugepaged: retract_page_tables() without mmap or vma lock") allowed concurrent retraction, and commit cf4a65539c13 ("memcg-v1: no need for memcg locking for MGLRU") dropped the walker's outer RCU protection. The fix is simple, so just fix the original commit so we don't have to speculate. To fix it, pass the actual PMD/PUD pointers. This restores the RCU-protected lookup and validation against the live PMD. Note that the PUD handling is required as well to handle folded page tables correctly in all cases. Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Josef Bacik in private. [ david: handle walk_pud_range() as well, clarify+simplify description, adjust Fixes: ]
CVE-2026-99733 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 4.7 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/truncate: look again if a folio left the mapping invalidate_inode_pages2_range() skips a folio which no longer belongs to the mapping by the time it has got the folio lock, on the assumption that somebody else has removed it from the page cache. But the folio may have been replaced, and then there is a new folio with the same data at that index. For most cases, like folio migration, that is impossible. However, collapse_file() only checks the refcount of the old folios, under the i_pages lock, and relies on their folio locks from there on. That works for users which repeat the lookup when they find folio->mapping changed. The following scenario is, however, possible: CPU0 pwrite(O_DIRECT) CPU1 collapse_file() kiocb_invalidate_pages() read the folio (old data), lock it refcount check the write completes copy to new_folio kiocb_invalidate_post_direct_write() find_get_entries() -> old folio xas_store(new_folio) folio->mapping = NULL folio_unlock(folio) folio_lock() folio->mapping != mapping -> continue In that scenario, the collapsed folio with the data from before the write stays in the page cache after the write has returned. This used to be impossible, as khugepaged only collapsed files that nobody had open for writing. Restart the lookup at that index, like shmem_undo_range() does. The same problem seems to exist in truncate_inode_pages_range() as well when truncate_inode_folio() fails, so handle it there as well, but slightly differently: simply check once more through find_get_entries().
CVE-2026-99730 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 5.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/filemap: finish fault cleanup before dropping the fault lock On a retried fault, a fatal signal interrupting the folio lock wait makes lock_folio_maybe_drop_mmap() drop the fault lock without pinning the file. However, filemap_fault() may still need to release mapping->invalidate_lock. A concurrent munmap() can release the last file reference and free the mapping before that unlock. Defer dropping the fault lock to filemap_fault()'s retry cleanup, after releasing invalidate_lock. If the fault lock was already dropped for I/O, release the existing file reference instead. Keep the fault lock held for FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT as before.
CVE-2026-99728 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 4.7 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/huge_memory: fix list corruption when deferred_split_scan() races with deferred_split_folio() Since the deferred split queue became a list_lru, the isolate callback moves the folios it took a reference on to an on-stack list, linked through folio->_deferred_list, and deferred_split_scan() takes them off that list with list_del_init() without holding the list_lru lock. deferred_split_folio() does not know about the on-stack list. It only holds the list_lru lock when it looks at the same list_head, and it can run for such a folio: a THP is queued when it is mapped, as a candidate for the underused check, and is queued "again" when a part of it gets unmapped: CPU0 deferred_split_scan() CPU1 deferred_split_folio() list_del_init(&folio->_deferred_list) next->prev = prev prev->next = next entry->next = entry list_lru_lock_irqsave() folio_set_partially_mapped() __list_lru_add() list_empty(item) -> true list_add_tail(item, &l->list) item->next = &l->list item->prev = tail entry->prev = entry The folio now sits on the list_lru with ->prev pointing to itself. The next removal leaves the neighbours pointing to it, and they still do so after the folio has been freed. With CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST: list_del corruption. prev->next should be ffd4000000270090, but was ffd4000000278090. (prev=ffd4000000270090) Fix it by grabbing the lock around list_del_init() so deferred_split_folio() cannot race with it.
CVE-2026-99723 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 3.3 Low
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vhost-vdpa: fix pinned page leak in vhost_vdpa_pa_map() error path When pin_user_pages() or vhost_vdpa_map() fails, vhost_vdpa_pa_map() is supposed to unpin the pages pinned after the last successfully mapped chunk, i.e. the range [map_pfn, last_pfn]. The unpin is guarded by nchunks, but nchunks is reset to 0 every time a chunk is mapped from inside the current page list, so a failure after any such boundary leaves that pending range pinned forever. With physically scattered memory nearly every page list contains a boundary, so the leak happens on practically every failed IOTLB update. The pending range is non-empty exactly when a page has been pinned, which last_pfn already tells us, so drop nchunks and test last_pfn.
CVE-2026-99722 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 6.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vringh: bound top-level re-entry into indirect tables In __vringh_iov(), the F_INDIRECT branch descends into the indirect table and continues before the descriptor accounting runs. A top-level indirect descriptor is therefore never charged to count. If such a descriptor sets NEXT to point back at itself, returning from the indirect table resumes at the same top-level descriptor, which is again not counted, so the walk never makes forward progress. Because count stays flat and indirect_count is reset to 0 on every return to the top-level table, neither bound in the loop check trips. A guest can spin the vringh worker at 100% CPU inside __vringh_iov(), an uninterruptible host DoS. Move the descriptor accounting above the indirect switch so that a top-level indirect descriptor is charged one top-level traversal step before the walk descends into its table, bringing this re-entry under the existing vrh->vring.num bound. Each top-level descriptor is still charged at most one step and indirect_count still bounds a single table, so legitimate chains (including the multiple-indirect case in tools/virtio/vringh_test.c) stay within vring.num, while a cyclic indirect descriptor is now rejected with -ELOOP.