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Search Results (110803 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-88232 | 1 Microsoft | 5 Windows 11 24h2, Windows 11 25h2, Windows 11 26h1 and 2 more | 2026-11-10 | 7.8 High |
| Use after free in Windows Camera Frame Server Monitor allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-88230 | 1 Microsoft | 13 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 10 more | 2026-11-10 | 7.8 High |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows LUAFV allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-88228 | 1 Microsoft | 13 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 10 more | 2026-11-10 | 7 High |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-88227 | 1 Microsoft | 13 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 10 more | 2026-11-10 | 7.8 High |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-88221 | 1 Microsoft | 8 Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2, Windows 10 22h2 and 5 more | 2026-11-10 | 7 High |
| Use after free in Windows Broadcast DVR User Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-70240 | 1 Microsoft | 13 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 10 more | 2026-11-10 | 7.5 High |
| Missing release of memory after effective lifetime in Windows Kerberos allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-70120 | 1 Microsoft | 13 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 10 more | 2026-11-10 | 7 High |
| Use after free in Microsoft Bluetooth Driver allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-70231 | 1 Microsoft | 13 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 10 more | 2026-11-10 | 7 High |
| Use after free in Windows Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-85862 | 1 Microsoft | 13 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 10 more | 2026-11-10 | 7 High |
| Double free in Windows Error Reporting allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99284 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-10 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: skbuff: propagate shared-frag marker in skb_zerocopy() skb_zerocopy() moves frag descriptors from @from into @to and takes a reference on each frag, but it does not copy skb_shinfo(from)->flags into skb_shinfo(to)->flags. A destination skb holding the same page-cache backed frags as the source therefore reports skb_has_shared_frag() as false. That breaks the invariant relied on by later in-place writers. ESP input checks skb_has_shared_frag() before deciding whether an uncloned nonlinear skb can skip skb_cow_data(); with the marker lost, an skb that skb_zerocopy() built for nfnetlink_queue or for an openvswitch upcall is decrypted in place, letting an unprivileged user write into the page cache of a root-owned read-only file. Propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG when frag descriptors are copied, as done for the other frag-transfer helpers. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99281 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-10 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tun: Require CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach to an ownerless device Twenty years ago I made creating a tuntap device require CAP_NET_ADMIN in commit ca6bb5d7ab22 ("[NET]: Require CAP_NET_ADMIN to create tuntap devices.") The idea was to allow the permissions on /dev/net/tun to be relaxed to 0666 and thus allow owners of tun devices assigned with TUNSETOWNER to actually open it and get at their devices. What we missed at the time was that persistent devices with *no* owner were already essentially world-consumable, and anyone who could open the device node could also attach to those. Even then, using persistent devices with no explicitly set owner — on the (false) presumption that CAP_NET_ADMIN would be required to open them — wasn't an egregious userspace bug. There are cases where it does make sense to separate the creation/configuration of the netdevice, from the process which shovels packets into it. Since then, TUNSETGROUP was added a year later in commit 8c644623fe7e ("[NET]: Allow group ownership of TUN/TAP devices."). Its commit message noted that if both uid and gid are set, both have to match (in itself a bizarre choice) — but still not that with *neither* set, no permission at all was required. Then in 2012 commit c8d68e6be1c3 ("tuntap: multiqueue support") allowed new queues to be attached to a device from the moment of its creation, with no way for userspace to close the race between creation and a subsequent TUNSET{OWNER,GROUP}. In 2024, commit 3ca459eaba1bf ("tun: fix group permission check") tried to fix things to be saner: only require the user *or* the group to match, in line with standard POSIX permissions, and require CAP_NET_ADMIN if neither the user nor group authorised the access (although it put the CAP_NET_ADMIN check first, and would wrongly have reported the capability as having been used even when it was not). That fix was reverted in commit a70c7b3cbc06 ("tun: revert fix group permission check") due to allegedly causing a regression in an selinux test suite which *expected* the attachment to succeed when authorised by none of user, group, nor CAP_NET_ADMIN: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAFqZXNtkCBT4f+PwyVRmQGoT3p1eVa01fCG_aNtpt6dakXncUg@mail.gmail.com/ We should not break UAPI. But we don't have to consider an selinux test case which deliberately exercises a security flaw to be UAPI worth preserving either. To which end, I have fixed it in selinux-testsuite commit b2f894f0016b ("tests/tun_tap: set an owner on the device for the relabel tests"). So: fix the lack of CAP_NET_ADMIN check on devices which *haven't* been assigned an owner or group, while leaving the weird tun ownership model as it was (user *and* group have to match, if both are set). If someone still wants to fix the latter (which wasn't actually the reason the previous attempt was reverted), they can do it under separate cover. Permit attaching to an existing device only if an owner and/or group was set and the caller matches all that were set, or if the caller has CAP_NET_ADMIN. The only behavioural change is that a device with no owner or group now requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach — precisely the loophole we want to close. And put the CAP_NET_ADMIN check in the right place this time. | ||||
| CVE-2026-62903 | 1 Microsoft | 3 Microsoft Data Sqlclient 6 1, Microsoft Data Sqlclient 7 0, Microsoft Data Sqlclient 7 1 | 2026-11-10 | 7.4 High |
| Authentication bypass by capture-replay in SQL Server allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99270 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-10 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Fix potential UAF in reqsk_timer_handler(). When TCP socket migration fails at inet_ehash_insert() in reqsk_timer_handler(), we jump to the no_ownership: label and free the new reqsk immediately with __reqsk_free(). Thus, we must stop the new reqsk's timer before jumping to the label, but the timer might be missed since the cited commit, resulting in UAF. As we are in the original reqsk's timer context, we can safely call timer_delete_sync() for the new reqsk. Let's pass false to __inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop() to stop the new reqsk's timer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-83684 | 1 Microsoft | 4 Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2019, Windows Server 2022 and 1 more | 2026-11-10 | 7.5 High |
| Buffer over-read in Windows iSCSI Target Service allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99122 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-10 | 7.3 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock/vmci: validate packet source for connected sockets vmci_transport_recv_stream_cb() looks up sockets first by the full source and destination tuple, then by destination only in the bound table. The fallback can select a non-listening socket without checking whether the packet came from its stored peer. This was reproduced with two VMCI contexts. A RST from the context not stored in a TCP_SYN_SENT socket reset that socket after it was selected by the destination-only lookup. VMCI can process notification packets in bottom-half context when the socket is not owned by user context, or defer packets to a workqueue. Use vsock_check_source() after taking the socket lock in the bottom-half path, and recheck after lock_sock() in the workqueue path. Listening sockets continue to accept packets from any source. Reply with a RST addressed from the received packet before dropping a source that fails validation. This preserves the existing reset behavior for bound non-listening and concurrently closed sockets without directing the reset to a connected socket's stored peer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-85801 | 1 Microsoft | 13 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 10 more | 2026-11-10 | 7.8 High |
| Use after free in Windows Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-94513 | 1 Microsoft | 4 Microsoft Sql Server 2022 For X64-based Systems \(cu27\), Sql Server 2022, Sql Server 2025 and 1 more | 2026-11-10 | 8 High |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in SQL Server allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99109 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-10 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: reject SetEA requests that do not fit the request buffer CIFSSMBSetEA() copies the caller's extended attribute value into the SMB request buffer without checking that it fits. The requirement is stated in the source but was never implemented: /*BB add length check to see if it would fit in negotiated SMB buffer size BB */ /* if (ea_value_len > buffer_size - 512 (enough for header)) */ if (ea_value_len) memcpy(parm_data->list.name + name_len + 1, ea_value, ea_value_len); The only bound applied on the way in is in cifs_xattr_set(): #define MAX_EA_VALUE_SIZE CIFSMaxBufSize ... if (size > MAX_EA_VALUE_SIZE) CIFSMaxBufSize is the full payload capacity of the buffer, so a value of exactly that size leaves no room for the SMB header, the TRANS2 parameter block, the fealist header and the EA name that are written ahead of it in the same object. SendReceive() already enforces the correct limit on this very length: if (in_len > CIFSMaxBufSize + MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE) but it is called after the copy has taken place. An unprivileged setxattr(2) on an SMB1 mount with a 250-byte name and a 16384-byte value writes 16384 bytes starting 345 bytes into a 16588-byte cifs_request object, ending 141 bytes past it: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in CIFSSMBSetEA+0xabc/0xde0 Write of size 16384 at addr ffff888003aa0159 by task init/68 __asan_memcpy+0x3c/0x60 CIFSSMBSetEA+0xabc/0xde0 cifs_xattr_set+0xd3a/0xff0 __vfs_setxattr+0x13e/0x1a0 The buggy address is located 345 bytes inside of allocated 16588-byte region Apply SendReceive()'s limit to the assembled request before the copy rather than after it, and widen the byte counters so the sum cannot wrap before it is tested. byte_count is also tested against U16_MAX, because it is stored in the 16-bit pSMB->ByteCount. That becomes reachable when CIFSMaxBufSize is raised at module load, where it may be set as high as 1024*127: with a 5-byte EA name and a 65521-byte value, count is exactly U16_MAX while byte_count is 65556, and cpu_to_le16() would truncate it to 20 and transmit a frame whose ByteCount does not match its length. Testing byte_count covers count as well, since byte_count is the larger of the two and count's only 16-bit consumer is written after this point. check_add_overflow() is evaluated first so that total_len is assigned before it is reported. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98978 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-10 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: never expire a locked mount Locked mounts are special. They protect the underlying files and directories from being revealed. do_umount() refuses to unmount locked mounts but shrink_submounts() doesn't. A shrinkable mount can become locked once the owner of a user namespace puts it beneath a locked mount with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH. The locked property now moves to the mount at the bottom making it possible to unmount the top mount. So umount() of an unlocked ancestor now expires the bottom mount first and the covered directory is revealed: move_mount(c -> x/hidden, MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH) = 0 the cover after the lock moved: umount2(x/hidden) = 0 the holder of the lock: umount2(x/hidden) = EINVAL the root of the copy, busy: umount2(x) = EBUSY reads x/hidden/secret: "covered-by-root" So leave a locked mount alone as it dies together with its parent. A plain umount() of an unlocked mount with a locked one below it is EBUSY from now on. It's the same for any other locked child. A lazy umount still takes the whole tree. mark_mounts_for_expiry() never sees a locked mount. lock_mnt_tree() leaves a mount on an expiry list alone and nothing else puts a locked one on such a list. Add an assert for this. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98853 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-11-10 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: gso: limit recursive IP-in-IP segmentation IP-in-IP GSO can re-enter inet_gso_segment() or ipv6_gso_segment() for each nested IP header. encap_level tracks header bytes, not callback depth, so a deep chain can exhaust the kernel stack. Making inet_gso_segment() stackable introduced unbounded IPv4 nesting; IPIP GSO/TSO later made the path reachable. The IPv6 stackable path was introduced separately and uses the same guard. Count IPv4 and IPv6 GSO handler entries in skb_gso_cb, initialized once per top-level GSO operation and preserved across GRE/UDP context changes. Use the existing IP_TUNNEL_RECURSION_LIMIT for both handlers. The first five entries pass, and the sixth returns -EINVAL before dispatching another GSO callback. | ||||